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Summary and Proposals
Introduction
 Nagasaki University was a victim of the atomic bombing in August 1945 and founded 
the Research Center for Nuclear Weapons Abolition (RECNA) three years ago. This proposal 
is written by the RECNA. The proposal will be submitted to concerned states and the 
international community and has been written with the sincerest of hopes that it serves as a 
proposal for policies so that Japan, being a victim of nuclear bombs, can contribute to realizing 
a nuclear weapon free world.
 Japan’s civil society played a critical role in conceptualizing a Northeast Asia Nuclear 
Weapon-Free Zone (NEA-NWFZ) over past decades.  However, the various forms that a NEA-
NWFZ might take did not gain much traction with states in the region (except for Mongolia) 
although these forms gained substantial local and city government-level support. In 2011, a 
conceptual breakthrough occurred when renowned international political scientist Morton H. 
Halperin (former Special Assistant to the U.S. President) was commissioned by Nautilus 
Institute to provide a framework whereby states could establish the geo-strategic conditions 
that would realistically realize a NEA-NWFZ. Halperin proposed to establish a NEA-NWFZ as 
an element of a Comprehensive Agreement on Peace and Security in NEA. He presented this 
concept at the Nautilus Institute workshop in Tokyo in November 2011.
 The RECNA has held three international workshops in Nagasaki, Seoul and Tokyo in 
order to examine and develop the Halperin’s proposal, and to make this Proposal. The 
workshops received support from other institutes that share interests in the comprehensive 
approach, including the Nautilus Institute. However, the RECNA is responsible for all 
contents of this Proposal.
 This Proposal does not deal with the entire scope of Northeast Asian security; instead, 
it focuses on denuclearization issues while considering the implication denuclearization would 
have on regional security. On top of denuclearization, Northeast Asia is faced with various hot 
button issues, such as; territorial disputes, disputes on historical records, and rising military 
tensions stemming from United States, Japan, and China’s new defense policies. Issues 
surrounding the denuclearization of Northeast Asia are not entirely unrelated to these 
problems; however, as this proposal will demonstrate, the NEA-NWFZ can be pursued 
relatively independently from these other issues. Furthermore, solving the nuclear weapons 
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issue will have a positive in uence on various other issues.
 The 70
th
 memorial of the end of the Paci c War is in 2015. In Northeast Asia, Japan’s 
colonization of Korea came to an end in 1945 and brought with it the National Liberation of 
Korea. However, it was the same year that led to the division of the Korean Peninsula and 
strained U.S.-North Korea and Japan-North Korea relations that are ongoing even today. It 
will also be the 70
th
 anniversary since the atomic bombings of Nagasaki and Hiroshima. There 
are people (“hibaku-sha”) still living in Japan and both Koreas who are experiencing medical 
aftereffects from the bombings and are “living testaments to the inhumanity” of nuclear 
weapons. We hope that this proposal will contribute to satisfying the yearning of the region 
for the uni cation of the Korean Peninsula and for a world free from nuclear weapons.
Chapter 1
Northeast Asia’s Current State of Dependence on Nuclear Weapons
ROK and Japan’s Dependence on Extended Nuclear Deterrence
 The Northeast Asian region’s nuclear confrontation is severely aggravated as North 
Korea’s nuclear weapons development program is currently triggering Japan and South 
Korea’s stronger dependence on the U.S. extended nuclear deterrence. The result is a 
heightened risk of nuclear weapon use, whether intentional or not, and is diminishing 
international efforts towards achieving a nuclear weapon free world. There are many 
intertwining elements creating the current situation. These elements include North Korea 
feeling the U.S. nuclear weapons are a threat to its regime, a risk that there will be a growing 
base of Japanese and South Korean proponents for developing their own nuclear weapons 
should their trust in depending on U.S. extended nuclear deterrence be rattled, and the fact 
that strengthening of the missile defense system in the region as a means of extended 
deterrence could be seen as a threat to China. In order to resolve recent nuclear tensions in 
the Northeast Asian region, it is necessary to consider resolving all these issues.
 The atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945 and radioactive 
contamination of the Japanese shing boats in 1954 by a U.S. hydrogen bomb test have left an 
anti-nuclear weapon sentiment in the hearts of many Japanese. As a result, the Atomic 
Energy Basic Act of 1955 banned the military use of nuclear energy. On the other end of the 
spectrum, were Japanese policies adopted to depend on U.S. extended nuclear deterrence 
following Chinese nuclear weapon tests in 1964. Introduced by Prime Minister Eisaku Sato in 
1968, the Three Non-Nuclear Principles stated that “Japan shall neither possess, 
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manufacture, nor allow to bring in nuclear weapons”, and was coupled with Japan’s 
dependence on the U.S. nuclear umbrella. Since focus has been placed on North Korea’s 
nuclear weapon development program, Japan and the U.S. have enhanced discussions on 
possible measures to maintain the credibility of the extended nuclear deterrence, yet the 
discussion about the non-nuclear elements of deterrence has also been included. The “Two-
plus-Two” meeting involving the top defense and diplomatic officials from the two nations 
reaf rmed its “commitment to the security of Japan through the full range of U.S. military 
capabilities, including nuclear and conventional” (Paragraph 1.6).
 Even though Japan has non-nuclear weapon policies in place, the fear of Japan 
gaining its own nuclear arsenal does not go away. The demeanor of a small fraction of 
politicians and certain government bureaucracies’ attitudes towards nuclear weapon 
dependence are typically the cause of these anxieties (Paragraph 1.7). One reason for 
suspicions over Japan’s intent towards nuclear armament is how Japan is incapable of 
producing a logical explanation for its plutonium policies. In context of the Northeast Asian 
region, this issue has become a backdrop to South Korea’s argument for its nuclear 
sovereignty (Paragraph 1.8).
 North Korea and South Korea were at the peak of a possible nuclear war during the 
Cold War. Beginning in 1958, the United States began deploying tactical nuclear weapons in 
South Korea, which were not removed until 1991 following the end of the Cold War. It goes 
without saying that South Korea’s armed forces had cooperated with U.S. armed forces in 
maintaining nuclear war scenarios in ROK. In 1992, however, the two Koreas made a 
groundbreaking Joint Declaration of South and North Korea on the Denuclearization of the 
Korean Peninsula. It came into effect together with “The Agreement on Reconciliation, Non-
aggression, and Cooperation and Exchange between the South and the North”. The preamble 
of the Joint Declaration even stated that their goal was “to create conditions and an 
environment favorable to peace and peaceful unification of Korea”. Thus, the declaration 
linked denuclearization intimately to reuni cation. The Joint Declaration on Denuclearization 
not only banned the production and development of nuclear weapons but also agreed to “not 
possess nuclear reprocessing and uranium enrichment facilities” (Paragraph 1.10).
 The South-North Joint Nuclear Control Commission set forth by the Joint Declaration 
on Denuclearization crumbled and it became evident that North Korea was developing its 
nuclear program. Aimed at preventing the development, South Korea worked closely with the 
U.S. to carry out diplomatic efforts. South Korea simultaneously strengthened its dependence 
on U.S. extended nuclear deterrence. The ROK-U.S. Security Consultative Meeting, which has 
been held annually since 1968, between the U.S. Secretary of Defense and ROK Minister of 
National Defense has repeatedly reaffirmed the U.S. commitment to provide its “Nuclear 
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Umbrella”. The two nations agreed to intensify the extended deterrence following North 
Korea’s rst nuclear weapons test in 2006 and established the “U.S.-South Korea Extended 
Deterrence Policy Committee” in 2011. The U.S. stated that it would “provide and strengthen 
extended deterrence for the ROK using the full range of military capabilities, including the 
U.S. nuclear umbrella, conventional strike, and missile defense capabilities”, which once again 
emphasized the element of non-nuclear, conventional weapons in its extended deterrence 
(Paragraph 1.11).
 While there had been a demand in South Korea for nuclear sovereignty to develop a 
nuclear program, North Korea’s development of their nuclear program gave steam to new 
efforts in South Korea. Following North Korea’s third nuclear test in February 2013, a survey 
showed 70% of the South Korean population backed developing their own nuclear weapons 
and several influential politicians reportedly expressed their desire for nuclear armament. 
Also, South Korea strongly emphasized their desire to amend the ROK-U.S. Agreement for 
Peaceful Use of Nuclear Energy into an agreement that includes a “comprehensive consent” 
clause similar to the one that Japan has under the Japan-U.S. Agreement, which continuously 
allows Japan to reprocess spent nuclear fuel.
 In accordance with the Obama administration’s “Nuclear Posture Review (NPR)”, the 
role of nuclear weapons in nuclear deterrence is to be reduced while strengthening 
conventional weapon’s role for extended deterrence in South Korea and Japan, which is a 
welcome move. Considering the tremendous destruction that nuclear weapons can cause, 
however, the sheer presence of any nuclear component in extended deterrence prevents 
alleviating nuclear tensions in Northeast Asia. It is necessary to develop the concept of 
“non-military (deterrence) – strong, trusting political relationships between the 
United States and its allies and partners”, as was referred to in the same NPR.
North Korea’s Development of Nuclear Deterrence
 The graphite-moderated reactor came online in 1986 after North Korea signed the 
NPT (Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons) in 1985. However, confrontations 
over the IAEA’s inspection regarding the DPRK’s initial declaration, as required by the NPT, 
became heated and North Korea announced its withdrawal from the NPT in March 1993. The 
situation led to rigid U.S.-DPRK meetings, which negotiations became the prototype of all 
following meetings regarding North Korea’s nuclear program. 
 It is, therefore, safe to say that the fundamental logic for North Korea’s nuclear 
weapons program and its possible denuclearization was set in the agreement reached in June 
1993 at the U.S.-DPRK Meeting. This fundamental logic had repeatedly appeared in later 
negotiations with some modifications. The logic is built towards achieving the following 
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two principles: “guaranteeing the security assurance against the threat and use of 
force, including nuclear weapons” and “denuclearizing Korean Peninsula with 
”.
 The 1994 “Agreed Framework between the U.S. and the DPRK” added the element of 
energy assistance. The Joint Statement agreed on at the Six-Party Talks in September 2005 
added the element of consultations between the concerned state parties with the intent of 
normalizing U.S.-North Korea and North Korea-Japan diplomatic relations and to promote a 
lasting peace in Northeast Asia. Even today, this important element should form the base of 
agreements. As will be demonstrated later, the September 19
th
 Joint Statement remains 
crucial, even in 2015. North Korea’s diplomatic strategy since 2006, in which the DPRK 
continued to negotiate for denuclearization while conducting nuclear tests, can be de ned as a 
diplomacy that attempts to eliminate the threat against its regime and to normalize 
international relations by playing both the processes and the products of 
developing nuclear deterrence as diplomatic cards. It must be assumed that such 
diplomatic strategy will continue taking place.
 The 1994 Agreed Framework between the U.S. and the DPRK and its establishment of 
the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO) in 1995 demonstrated 
promising success towards the end of 2000 (Paragraph 1.13). However, the U.S. policy did 
not continue because of the administration change, and the relationship between the U.S. and 
North Korea, which the Bush administration viewed as being a part of the Axis of Evil, 
became its worst. As a result, the KEDO process crumbled. Certain success and the ultimate 
failure of the KEDO process left a lesson to be learned. One lesson, which could be a precedent 
moving forward, is that KEDO succeeded in a multilateral scheme where the EU and nine 
other countries were involved in the U.S.-ROK-Japan centered program. On the other hand, a 
mechanism must be introduced to prevent hard-earned agreements from failing when a 
central player goes through administration changes.
 The Six-Party Talks agreed on initial actions in February 2007 that were in line with 
the September 19
th
 Joint Statement and North Korea froze three Yongbyon facilities (5 
megawatt Experimental Reactor, the Reprocessing Plant (Radiochemical Laboratory) and the 
Nuclear Fuel Rod Fabrication Facility). They also established ve working groups. One group 
deserving of attention is the “Northeast Asia Peace and Security Mechanism”. It was a 
possible platform for a more comprehensive discussion relating to denuclearization. In October 
of the same year, the six parties agreed on its second phase actions, which called for “the 
disablement of three facilities at Yongbyon” and “a complete and correct declaration of all its 
nuclear programs” by North Korea. It was estimated that, as of April 2009, the former 
agreement to disable North Korea’s facilities was 80% completed. Reaching an impasse on the 
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latter, the Six-Party Talks have not been held since December 2008.
 In April 2009, North Korea announced its launch of the Juche Nuclear Industry, 
decided to build an experimental light water reactor in Yongbyon, and publicized that it would 
begin enriching uranium to feed the reactor. In November 2010, Siegfried Hecker, a former 
Director of the Los Alamos National Laboratory, and other U.S. experts were invited to take a 
tour of the Yongbyon facilities. The Kim Jong-un regime’s nuclear deterrence policies and the 
possibility of denuclearization will be detailed in Chapter 4. North Korea’s diplomatic 
position towards denuclearization remains unchanged, however, in that it is attempting to 
develop nuclear deterrence and to remove a threat towards its regime. 
Chapter 2
Demand from the Global Nuclear Disarmament Objective
 The strong tide of global efforts, following President Obama’s Prague speech, towards 
achieving a “Nuclear Weapon Free World” first manifested itself in the NPT Review 
Conference’s 2010 Final Document. Each state party agreed that it “affirms that all States 
need to make special efforts to establish the necessary framework to achieve and maintain a 
world without nuclear weapons” and “expresses its deep concern at the catastrophic 
humanitarian consequences of any use of nuclear weapons”. Moreover, all State Parties 
committed to “pursue policies that are fully compatible with the Treaty and the objective of 
achieving a world without nuclear weapons”. Namely, in this commitment, all state parties, 
both nuclear and non-nuclear weapon states, agreed to place political obligations on state 
governments to evaluate security policies that stood in the way of achieving this goal and to 
alter such policies (Paragraph 2.1). 
 In 2013, the UN General Assembly held the sessions of the “Open-ended Working 
Group (OEWG) to develop proposals to take forward multilateral nuclear disarmament 
negotiations for the achievement and maintenance of a world without nuclear weapons”. The 
OEWG report clarified the political obligation placed on each and every signatory 
government per the 2010 agreement by noting a new concept that “States have differentiated 
roles and functions”. It goes without saying that nuclear weapon states were emphasized to 
veri ably reduce and eventually eliminate its nuclear weapons. The OEWG report, though, 
added that non-nuclear weapon States “have a role in promoting global nuclear disarmament” 
and that non-nuclear weapon States under extended nuclear deterrence could ful ll the role of 
“reducing the salience of nuclear weapons in security doctrines”. The OEWG further discussed 
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“the role of nuclear weapon free zones in challenging the value and legitimacy of 
nuclear weapons” (Paragraph 2.2). 
 A deepening awareness of the humanitarian impact of nuclear weapon use has led to a 
no-use declaration that states, “It is in the interest of the very survival of humanity that 
nuclear weapons are never used again, under any circumstances”. Certain states attempted to 
discourage such an argument from growing by emphasizing the critical role nuclear deterrence 
plays in guaranteeing security. Analyzing the controversy objectively, however, it is 
contradictory to emphasize the impact on humanity that using nuclear weapons could have 
while refusing to declare to not use nuclear weapons. This contradiction can be resolved 
by pursuing security policies that deny the very possibility of using nuclear 
weapons (Paragraph 2.3).
 Included in the final document of 2010 NPT Review Conference was the need “to 
further diminish the role and significance of nuclear weapons in all military and security 
concepts, doctrines and policies”. This statement is significant in that, on top of reducing 
nuclear weapon hardware, it calls for a reduction of nuclear weapon policies. A standardized 
reporting format is necessary to assure the transparency of these reductions. Therefore, the 
Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative (NPDI), which is a 12-nation group that 
includes Japan, has developed such a standard reporting format. One criterion in the standard 
format was to report “measures taken to diminish the role and signi cance of nuclear weapons 
in military and security concepts, doctrines and policies”. It was pointed out that states with 
security policies dependent on extended nuclear deterrence were also required to report this 
criterion (Paragraph 2.4). 
the NPT is a demand for policy changes by nations dependent on extended nuclear 
weapon deterrence. Japan and South Korea setting policies towards achieving a 
Northeast Asia nuclear weapon free zone would contribute greatly to increasing the 
NPT’s credibility and promoting denuclearization of the world (Paragraph 2.5).
Chapter 3
The Significance of a Northeast Asia Nuclear Weapon 
Free Zone and the Halperin Proposal
 North Korea’s developing nuclear weapons program intensified Japan and South 
Korea’s dependence on nuclear deterrence, which has heightened the region’s nuclear 
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confrontation. Anxieties of a nuclear domino effect in Japan and South Korea cannot be 
ignored. The situation would be further complicated should Japan, South Korea, and the U.S. 
implement a joint missile defense program as a military response under the assumption that 
North Korea’s developing ballistic missile program is linked to the development in their 
nuclear weapons program. The complication arises from the fact that the missile defense 
program would theoretically diminish the strength of China’s strategic nuclear weapons.
 The region’s progressing nuclear dependence runs counter to the international 
community’s goal of achieving a “Nuclear Weapon Free World”. The reaction to heightened 
regional tensions caused by North Korea’s nuclear weapons should not be to respond with 
strengthening dependence on extended nuclear deterrence or any military might, as is 
currently the case. Rather, focus should be placed on establishing a Northeast Asia Nuclear 
Weapons Free Zone (NEA-NWFZ), which would be the foundation for a cooperative security 
system in the region. Re ecting on the political obligations developed in the global nuclear 
disarmament arguments after the 2010 NPT Review Conference and placed on non-nuclear 
weapon states under extended nuclear deterrence, Japan and South Korea have an important 
role to play in this effort. Being the only country to have experienced nuclear bombings, Japan 
has an exceedingly large responsibility (Paragraph 3.1).
 There have been various, detailed proposals since the end of the Cold War for a NEA-
NWFZ. At present, the Three-plus-Three Arrangement, including its various modi cations, is 
considered to be a concise and pragmatic, fundamental structure. In this scheme, Japan, 
South Korea and North Korea would be the “Intrazonal States” and the U.S., Russia, and 
China̶nuclear weapon states under NPT with deep ties to the region̶would be the 
“Neighboring Nuclear Weapon States”. The Intrazonal States would form a geographic 
nuclear weapon free zone and would be required to assume non-nuclear obligations similar to 
other NWFZ treaties. The Neighboring Nuclear Weapon States would be required to provide 
security assurances not to attack the zone with nuclear weapons and, hopefully, with 
conventional weapons (negative security assurances) as parties of the treaty itself rather than 
of its protocol (Paragraph 3.2). Details of the NEA-NWFZ are found in Chapter 6.
 The 2011 Halperin Proposal was significant in that it shifted the framework of the 
arguments on a NEA-NWFZ from scheme-centered arguments to approach-centered 
arguments. In order to overcome the difficulties he had faced in working towards North 
Korean denuclearization, Halperin proposed establishing the NEA-NWFZ as one of the six 
elements for a “Comprehensive Agreement on Peace and Security in Northeast Asia”. Halperin 
suggested that six elements to be included in the Comprehensive Agreement are as follows: 1. 
Termination of the State of War, 2. Creation of a Permanent Council on Security, 3. Mutual 
Declaration of No Hostile Intent, 4. Provisions of Assistance for Nuclear and Other Energy, 5. 
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Termination of Sanctions, and 6. Nuclear Weapons Free Zone.
 The Halperin Proposal has been backed for the following reasons that include 
Halperin’s own arguments for the case: 1. Accepting North Korea’s de facto nuclear weapon 
state may collapse the international non-proliferation system and lead to a domino effect in 
Japan and South Korea. 2. Therefore, international efforts, which should be tangible, should 
continue so long as there remains even a sliver of hope that North Korea can be denuclearized. 
3. There must be a new approach that avoids placing blame for stalled past negotiations 
towards denuclearization of Korean Peninsula on one another. 4. Although there is a need for 
a comprehensive approach that simultaneously solves multiple pending issues, the approach 
should not attempt to solve all of the regional security issues at once. Rather, it should be a 
restrained approach that comprehensively solves issues directly related to denuclearization. 5. 
Reaching an agreement on the denuclearization issues could shape the discussion on solving 
the region’s other security issues.
Chapter 4
The Possibility of North Korea’s Denuclearization
 At the March 31, 2013 Central Committee of the Workers’ Party of Korea, First 
Secretary Kim Jong-un introduced a new strategic line on “carrying out economic construction 
and building nuclear armed forces simultaneously” and reaffirmed such a “promoting two 
fronts simultaneously” strategy during his 2015 New Year Address. The new strategy is a 
manifestation of a crucial change in that it has relativized its “military first (Songun) 
doctrine”. Depending on the circumstances, tensions could potentially rise as high as they did 
in 2010. North Korea’s provocative shock techniques have been analyzed as being aimed at 
altering the rules of the game and as dif cult as it may be, it is crucial to be patient and react 
with a level head (Paragraph 4.1).
 The North Korean Supreme People’s Assembly adopted a “Law on Consolidating 
Position of Nuclear Weapons State” in April 2013 and set forth polices and doctrines for use of 
nuclear weapons. Around the same time, North Korea announced the Yongbyon graphite-
moderated reactor would resume operations, and satellite imagery taken in August 2013 
showed expanded uranium enrichment facilities. These developments implied that North 
Korea was solidifying its long-term position on maintaining its nuclear deterrence. But this 
does not necessarily mean that North Korea contends that it’s denuclearization is possible 
only after “the global denuclearization”, or in other words after achieving a “World without 
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Nuclear Weapons”, as it was once stated by North Korea in the spring of 2013.
 In June 2013 the DPRK National Defense Commission emphasized that the 
denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula means “the complete one that calls for 
denuclearizing the whole peninsula including South Korea and aims at totally ending the U.S. 
nuclear threat to the DPRK” and then proposed “senior-level talks between the authorities of 
the DPRK and the U.S.” North Korea has since repeated the same line of argument for its 
denuclearization on the condition of complete elimination of threats. It can be inferred that 
North Korea is staying their course in maintaining their nuclear deterrence while 
attempting to diplomatically remove the U.S. threat. It should be considered that a 
(Paragraph 4.2).
 Because of the limited availability of information, assessments of North Korea’s 
nuclear weapon capabilities often differ. One thing that is certain from the three nuclear 
weapon tests is that North Korea does in fact possess nuclear explosive devices. What has not 
been agreed on is whether or not North Korea has weaponized the devices to be loaded on 
delivery vehicles (Paragraph 4.3). As of the end of 2014, it has been estimated that North 
Korea is in possession of enough ssile material (plutonium and highly enriched uranium) to 
produce twelve nuclear warheads. According to the available information, North Korea’s 
nuclear ssile material production capabilities are rather limited. However, it is dif cult to 
predict how North Korea’s capabilities will develop in the coming future. It is important to 
recognize that as more time lapses until denuclearization negotiations resume, the 
more time is available for the situation to worsen (Paragraph 4.4).
 Since ring its rst long-range ballistic missile, Taepodong-1, in August 1998, North 
Korea has launched ve long-range ballistic missiles/satellites. Rather than showing any signs 
of contradiction, publicly available technological information shows that all three launches 
since 2009 were satellite launches. It would then be reasonable to assume that the 1998 and 
2006 launches carried the same purpose. However, it goes without saying that each of these 
launches leads to improving North Korea’s ballistic missile launching capabilities. The North 
Korean missile issues should be treated as an issue for the dual-use and crossover 
between space and ballistic missile technologies. The discussion needs to begin by 
exploring what standards are expected of all nations (Paragraph 4.5).
 The United Nations Security Council has repeatedly made Presidential Statements 
and resolutions in response to North Korea’s nuclear weapon tests and “launches using 
ballistic missile technology”. Nuclear weapon issues can be traced back to North Korea’s 
announcement to withdraw from the NPT in 1993, whereas missile issues can be traced back 
to the moratorium on ballistic missile test launches that resulted from the U.S.-DPRK talks 
following the Taepodong-1 launch at the end of August 1998. It is important to recall that the 
Chapter 4  The Possibility of North Korea’s Denuclearization
10
U.N. Security Council resolution demanding North Korea to not conduct “any launch using 
ballistic missile technology” rst appeared in Resolution 1874 in 2009, which was the resolved 
in context of banning North Korea’s nuclear weapons development. When the primary issue 
of weapons of mass destruction (especially nuclear weapons) at hand is resolved, 
ballistic missile issue will become relatively a lesser concern (Paragraph 4.6).
Chapter 5
A Comprehensive Approach to the Denuclearization of Northeast Asia
 Halperin’s six elements included in his Comprehensive Agreement remain necessary. 
However, there must be a detailed deliberation on how to structure such elements into an 
agreement. Considering the processes and details for establishing a peace treaty that replaces 
the armistice treaty, the element of “Terminating the Korean War” will be an especially 
enormous undertaking. In fact, what is necessary for a comprehensive approach in its initial 
stage is a fundamental treaty like something exempli ed by the “Mutual Declaration of No 
Hostile Intent”, which is one of Halperin’s six elements. It should be a legal instrument to set 
political and ethical standards for the future that respects equal sovereignty and establishes a 
relationship based on respect and trust. In this respect, similar to the ASEAN Treaty of Amity 
and Cooperation in Southeast Asia (TAC), a Northeast Asia TAC was proposed during the 
workshop. As described above, this Proposal suggests that the agreement reached in a 
comprehensive approach should be composed of both legally enforceable, concise political 
agreements and agreements with details being introduced in phases (Paragraph 5.1).
  Addressing the right of peaceful use of nuclear energy is included in Halperin’s six 
elements. This Proposal suggests adding elements regarding the rights of peaceful exploration 
of space and the ban of all weapons of mass destruction on top of nuclear weapons to the 
comprehensive approach. These additional two elements will inevitably be brought up in the 
discussion of the six elements. Rather than complicating the entire matter, resolving these 
issues will smooth the process (Paragraph 5.2).
Proposal of a “Comprehensive Framework Agreement 
for the Denuclearization of Northeast Asia”
 Considering the history of past, failed joint statements among North Korea, U.S. and 
other countries, Halperin proposes a methodology where a legally binding agreement should 
be made rst, and then followed by negotiations for details. In principle, this Proposal agrees 
Chapter 5  A Comprehensive Approach to the Denuclearization of Northeast Asia
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with Halperin’s methodology. When political leadership is weak, however, it can be dif cult 
and take too much time to go through parliamentary processes necessary to ratify legal 
instruments (Paragraph 5.3).
 Based upon such considerations, the “Comprehensive Framework Agreement for the 
Denuclearization of Northeast Asia” (CFA) is proposed in this Proposal as an instrument to be 
concluded and effectuated by signatures of state heads of the Six-Party Talks. It would also be 
possible, in this case, to include speci c provisions within the CFA that are requested to be 
ratified and become strictly legally binding. Appointing an independent non-governmental, 
authoritative expert group for support and verification of CFA processes could alleviate 
concerns regarding the CFA being overruled by changing administrations. The expert group 
will be deeply involved in the process leading up to manifesting the CFA, and work for support 
and veri cation to ensure continuity of negotiations after an initial agreement is reached. 
 Speci c Chapters of a “Comprehensive Framework Agreement for the Denuclearization 
of Northeast Asia” are divided into “Declaratory” or “Actionable” categories and are composed 
of the following four (Paragraph 5.4): 
(1) Declare to terminate the Korean War and provide for mutual nonaggression, 
friendship, and equal sovereignty among CFA state parties. States lacking 
diplomatic relations will endeavor to succeed in normalizing its diplomatic relations. 
Encourage negotiations among states concerned for the Korean War Peace Treaty. 
(Declaratory)
(2) Assure equal rights to access all forms of energy, including nuclear energy. 
Establish a Northeast Asia Energy Cooperation Committee that is dedicated to 
contributing to the stability of Northeast Asia and the peaceful reunification of the 
Korean Peninsula. The invitation for committee members extends beyond the six-
parties and is open to any state or state groups supporting the cause. Participation of 
Mongolia and Canada would be welcome. (Declaratory. Actionable details will be 
decided by the Committee)
(3) Agree on a treaty to establish a Northeast Asia Nuclear Weapon Free Zone. It 
will include requirements to join the NPT and other details mandated to achieve a 
NWFZ. Signatory states are obligated to join the Chemical Weapons Convention. The 
agreement will protect the rights of signatory states for peaceful space exploration in 
accordance with the 1967 Outer Space Treaty. An article will be provided to place 
collective sanctions on states in violation of the treaty, while restricting any unilateral 
sanction imposed by an individual state party on account of treaty matters. (Actionable)
(4) Establish a permanent Northeast Asia Security Council. The primary objective 
of this council will be to ensure the implementation of the CFA. The secondary objective 
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will be, when appropriate, to serve as a platform for discussions involving various 
Northeast Asian security issues. In the future, the council is expected to deal with more 
comprehensive security issues. The council could host the veri cation mechanisms of 
the NEA-NWFZ. The Six-Parties will form the initial members of the Council, while 
member states of the Energy Cooperation Committee and any other states offering to 
cooperate for Northeast Asian security are welcome to be general members. 
(Actionable)
Northeast Asia Nuclear Weapon Free Zone Treaty
 The proposed “Northeast Asia Nuclear Weapon Free Zone Treaty” includes 
characteristics unique to the region, as shown below:
 State Parties: A six party treaty in a “Three-plus-Three Arrangement” (South Korea, 
North Korea, and Japan are “Intrazonal States” and the U.S., China, and Russia are 
“Neighboring Nuclear Weapon States”) would be the most likely to succeed in the current 
state of affairs. It would be even more desirable for Mongolia, a country with recognized 
Nuclear Weapon Free Status, to join the NEA-NWFZ as a diplomatic strategy following 
up its 20
th
 anniversary of its nuclear weapon free declaration in 2012 (Paragraph 5.5).
 Flexibility in Effectuating the Treaty: Doubts over achieving a NEA-NWFZ 
repeatedly point towards the lack of mutual trust between the states within the region. 
As the Treaty of Tlatelolco, which overcame dif culties between Brazil and Argentina to 
enter into force, demonstrates, however, the system in which articles enter into force can 
be exible in order to facilitate achieving a NEA-NWFZ. For instance, the entry-into-force 
requirements of the NEA-NWFZ treaty can be provided for through ratification by the 
three nuclear weapon states (U.S., Russia, China) and two non-nuclear weapon states 
(Japan and Korea). It may be plausible to provide an option for Japan and Korea to 
withdraw from the treaty after three to ve years, if North Korea continues not to join. By 
ratifying the treaty under this scheme, Japan and South Korea will enjoy security 
assurances sooner against the potential threats from nuclear weapon states other than 
the U.S. As for the bene ts to North Korea, an article can be included to provide North 
Korea with a certain period of time to dismantle its nuclear weapons and facilities, while 
the U.S. provides immediate security assurances in exchange for North Korea’s 
rati cation (Paragraph 5.6).
 Requirements Prior to Negotiations: Considering that states with nuclear 
weapons are involved in negotiating a NEA-NWFZ Treaty, there is a need to address the 
issue of guaranteeing that negotiations are held in good faith once the negotiations 
commence. For example, North Korea would be requested to commit to a moratorium of 
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nuclear weapon tests and other nuclear weapon related activities. The United States, 
South Korea, and Japan would likely be requested to commit to a moratorium of joint 
military exercises around the Korean Peninsula. Such mutually agreed “prior 
moratoriums” should be adopted before negotiations. The “prior moratoriums” should 
also explore alleviating current sanctions imposed on North Korea (Paragraph 5.7).
 Eliminating Dependence on Extended Nuclear Deterrence: When a NWFZ 
treaty is fully implemented, international law prevents the threat or use of nuclear 
weapons against the zone. This implies that non-nuclear weapon states within the NWFZ 
do not need extended nuclear deterrence or a nuclear umbrella. This is why a NWFZ is a 
recommendable mechanism towards cooperative security that does not depend on nuclear 
weapons. (Because the proposed CFA includes a non-aggression agreement, non-nuclear 
weapons states in NEA-NWFZ are protected from attacks and threats by conventional 
weapons, as well as by nuclear weapons. Considering past negotiations for a nuclear 
weapon-free Korean Peninsula, the possibility of including conventional weapons in the 
security assurances exists regarding a NEA-NWFZ.) Nonetheless, there are many 
concerns and fear over losing the nuclear umbrella. The argument for the fear is that 
states will be defenseless if one state violates the treaty and either attacks or threatens to 
attack other states. However, once a state violates the treaty, the treaty becomes null and 
void; the state of affairs will return to pre-treaty conditions, thus they will not be 
defenseless. To further alleviate anxieties, the treaty could provide that states may take 
sanctions against the offender in accordance with international law and their individual 
national constitution (Paragraph 5.8).
Views to the Diplomatic Process
 United Nations has recently been a platform for furthering discussions on a NEA-
MWFZ.  The Advisory Board on Disarmament Matters held in 2013 discussed the NEA-NWFZ. 
The results were recommendations to the Secretary General that the UN consider taking 
appropriate actions to establish the NWFZ and play a proactive role to establish regional forums 
for transparency and trust. Such a proposal coming from the United Nations is a large leap 
forward. Mongolian President Elbedgorj expressed his support for the NEA-NWFZ concept at 
the United Nations High Level Meeting on Nuclear Disarmament in September 2013 and 
reported on the commencement of the “Ulaanbaatar Dialogue on Northeast Asian Security” to 
build trust, which was also a major step. As the UN Disarmament Commission reported in 1999, 
any initiative to establish a NWFZ must come from the free will of the regional nations 
concerned. In this respect, it is essential that Japan and South Korea, individually or 
collectively, take initiatives to establish a NEA-NWFZ (Paragraph 5.10).
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 Although there may be other possibilities, resuming the Six-Party Talks would be 
considered most appropriate and practical to ensure a credible platform for the discussion of 
the “Comprehensive Framework Agreement for the Denuclearization of Northeast Asia”. 
Reportedly, North Korea, China, and Russia share an af rmative attitude towards resuming 
the Six-Party Talks at present. Considering that the United States is dealing with a vast 
amount of diplomatic problems, it is time for Japan and South Korea to act. Considering the 
NPT 2010 Final Document that expresses strong support of the Six-Party Talks, the upcoming 
2015 NPT Review Conference will be a signi cant diplomatic platform to address the issue.
 Considering the above analyses, the following proposals are made for a “Comprehensive 
Approach to a Northeast Asia Nuclear Weapon- Free Zone”:




 Establishing a NEA-NWFZ should not be an attempt at merely 
denuclearizing North Korea. Rather, the objective should be to solve 
various security issues closely linked to the nuclear issues in Northeast 
Asia through concluding a “Comprehensive Framework Agreement 
(CFA) for the Denuclearization of Northeast Asia”. 
 The CFA includes the following in its Chapters: (1) a declaratory chapter to terminate 
the Korean War and to provide for mutual non-aggression, friendship, and equal sovereignty, 
(2) a declaratory chapter to assure equal rights to access all forms of energy, including nuclear 
energy, and to establish a Northeast Asia Energy Cooperation Committee that is dedicated to 
contributing to the stability of Northeast Asia and the peaceful reuni cation of the Korean 
Peninsula, (3) a chapter to agree on an actionable treaty to establish a NEA-NWFZ that 
includes all the necessary provisions for a NWFZ, (4) an actionable chapter to establish a 
permanent Northeast Asia Security Council, which will ensure the solid implementation of 
the CFA and to be open to discuss the region’s other security issues. Through analyzing North 
Korea’s international and national policies up to the present, this paper concludes there is a 
suf cient possibility that North Korea will agree to a properly designed NEA denuclearization 
process.
Proposal Two:
 In addition to standard provisions for a NWFZ treaty, a NEA-
NWFZ treaty should include the following elements: 
 (1) the treaty will, at the very least, include all six states in the Six-Party Talks. North 
Korea, South Korea, and Japan will form a geographic nuclear weapon free zone, and as 
neighboring nuclear states, U.S., China, and Russia will provide security assurances against 
the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons as well as conventional weapons against the zone, 
(2) all parties are requested to join the Chemical Weapons Convention, (3) the treaty will 
assure the rights of peaceful exploration of space as provided for by the Outer Space Treaty, 
(4) North Korea is obliged to dismantle its nuclear arsenals and related facilities within a time 
16
frame with ample allowance, (5) the entry-into-force provision of the treaty will be made with 
incentives to enhance the likelihood of North Korea, South Korea, and Japan joining the 
treaty (Paragraphs 5.5 & 5.6).
Proposal Three:
 The Six-Party Talks should be resumed to discuss the 
“Comprehensive Framework Agreement for the Denuclearization of 
Northeast Asia”. 
 The Six-Party Talks established the working group for “Northeast Asia Peace and 
Security Mechanism”, which signifies its interest in exploring the denuclearization of the 
Korean Peninsula from a more comprehensive point of view. Considering the NPT 2010 Final 
Document strongly supported the resumption of the Six-Party Talks, the international 
community should unite to urge the resumption of the Talks before and after the 2015 Review 
Conference. Rather than dragging in the past, the resumed Six-Party Talks should take a 
fresh and bold approach, such as the “Comprehensive Framework Agreement” proposed here.
Proposal Four: 
 Utilizing the opportunity of existing international support to 
promote a NEA-NWFZ, regional non-nuclear states Japan and South 
Korea should, individually or collectively, launch an initiative towards 
establishing a NEA-NWFZ that includes the “Comprehensive Framework Agreement 
for the Denuclearization of Northeast Asia”. In 2013, the United Nations Advisory Board on 
Disarmament Matters recommended the Secretary General to consider appropriate action for 
the establishment of a NEA-NWFZ. Also, the Mongolian president expressed his enthusiasm 
in support of a NEA-NWFZ at the United Nations High-level Meeting on Nuclear 
Disarmament in 2013. As can be found in a 1999 United Nations Disarmament Commission 




 The year 2015 should be used as an opportunity to begin the 
processes for a “Comprehensive Framework Agreement for 
Denuclearization of Northeast Asia”. 
 The year is the 70
th
 memorial of the end of World War II, atomic bombings on 
Nagasaki and Hiroshima, and the division of the Korean Peninsula. The international 
community, and especially Northeast Asian nations, should make 2015 the year to begin 
endeavors towards achieving a “Comprehensive Framework Agreement for Denuclearization 
of Northeast Asia”. The CFA will be the foundation for easing tensions and normalizing 
relations in NEA and for moving towards a cooperative regional security system.
Proposal Six:
 By proposing to establish a NEA-NWFZ, Japan and South Korea 
should fulfil their obligations set forth by the 2010 NPT Review 
Conference and contribute to maintaining the credibility of the Treaty. 
 In the new review cycle following the 2010 NPT Review Conference, all State Parties, 
including non-nuclear weapon States, have a political obligation to “pursue policies that are 
fully compatible with the Treaty and the objective of achieving a world without nuclear 
weapons” (2010 NPT Review Conference Final Document, Action Plan 1). Furthermore, 
instead of focusing solely on the reduction of nuclear weapon hardware, the Review 
Conference agreed on the need “to further diminish the role and significance of nuclear 
weapons in all military and security concepts, doctrines and policies”. In this context, the 
obligations posed upon non-nuclear weapon States relying on extended nuclear deterrence, 
such as Japan and South Korea, are clearer.
Proposal Seven: 
 Concerned states should consider establishing an independent 
non-governmental “Expert Group for the Denuclearization of Northeast 
Asia” so that denuclearization processes will not be influenced by 
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administration changes within the concerned states. 
 Diplomatic negotiations between nations bear difficulties because they could be 
influenced by unrelated international incidents, domestic political shifts, or conflicts. 
Negotiations regarding the denuclearization in Northeast Asia have not been an exception. It 
is, therefore, necessary to construct a device to minimize such negative influences. 
Maintaining the wide-ranging public support, just as support by Japanese heads of local 
municipality demonstrated, is one meaningful method of doing so. Furthermore, it is 
necessary to consider establishing an “Expert Group for the Denuclearization of Northeast 
Asia”, which would contribute towards maintaining stable negotiations by working parallel to 




0.1　　Nagasaki Medical School, one of the predecessors to Nagasaki University, was 
located just 500 meters away from the epicenter of the atomic bomb dropped by the United 
States of America on August 9, 1945. It was the rst plutonium bomb ever used in a war eld 
and only the second ever nuclear weapon, following the bombing of Hiroshima and claimed the 
lives of approximately 900 students and faculty staff on campus during the summer break. 
Even today, the names of all who perished are inscribed in a monument at the University’s 
School of Medicine. Established as a national university following the war, Nagasaki 
University has academically been dedicated to the medical field of radiation treatment. 
Despite individual efforts, however, academic contributions to the disarmament of nuclear 
weapons have been nonexistent at an organizational level. When U.S. President Obama made 
his Prague address in April 2009, it acted as a catalyst for Nagasaki University to establish 
the Research Center for Nuclear Weapons Abolition, Nagasaki University (RECNA) in April 
2012. Motivated by its objective to achieve and maintain a nuclear weapon-free world, the 
RECNA conducts research, disseminates information and is involved in nuclear disarmament 
education; working closely alongside Nagasaki City and Nagasaki Prefecture. The results of 
RECNA’s first research project are being published in this book entitled “Proposal: A 
Comprehensive Approach to a Northeast Asia Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone”.
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0.2　　As a victim of nuclear weapons, Japan should adopt a non-nuclear security policy if it 
intends to further contribute to global nuclear disarmament, which will make it important to 
present any policy options for the government to consider. This became RECNA’s motivation 
to delve into the research eld of a nuclear weapon-free zone (NWFZ) in Northeast Asia. With 
the expertise of the RECNA staff in mind, the NWFZ was also an optimal eld of research for 
RECNA. Japan’s civil society played a critical role in conceptualizing a Northeast Asia NWFZ 
(NEA-NWFZ) over past decades. However, the various potential configurations of an NEA-
NWFZ had limited appeal to states in the region (except Mongolia), despite gaining 
substantial local and city government-level support. In 2011, a conceptual breakthrough 
occurred when renowned international political scientist Morton H. Halperin (former Special 
Assistant to the U.S. President) was commissioned by the Nautilus Institute to provide a 
framework whereby states could establish the geo-strategic conditions that would realistically 
achieve an NEA-NWFZ. Halperin proposed establishing an NEA-NWFZ as an element of a 
“Comprehensive Agreement on Peace and Security in NEA (HALPERIN 2011) and presented 
this concept at the Nautilus Institute workshop on East Asian Nuclear Security in Tokyo in 
November 2011. This process-oriented concept was quickly adopted as a basis for 
implementing an NWFZ strategy in various countries, including Japan. Against this backdrop, 
the RECNA set out a research project entitled “Developing a Comprehensive Approach to a 
Northeast Asia Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone”.
0.3　　Since 2012, the project organized three annual international workshops, which 
focused on examining a comprehensive approach to establishing an NEA-NWFZ. The rst 
workshop was entitled “Developing a Comprehensive Approach to an NEA-NWFZ: Workshop 
I”; held at Nagasaki University in December 2012 to share the research objective and widely 
disseminate Halperin’s proposal. The second workshop held at Hanshin University in Seoul 
in June 2013 was entitled “Envisioning Northeast Asia Peace and Security System: 
Developing a Comprehensive Approach to an NEA-NWEZ Workshop II”. The program and 
title of the second conference were deemed tting, given the upcoming 60
th
 anniversary of 
the Korean Armistice Agreement in July 2013. The third conference, held in Tokyo in 
September 2014, was entitled “Denuclearization of Northeast Asia and of the World －
Developing a Comprehensive Approach to NEA-NWFZ: Workshop III”. In consideration of 
the approaching year of 2015, which is the 70
th
 anniversary of the atomic bombings in 
Hiroshima and Nagasaki and the year of the NPT Review Conferences, the theme of a NEA-
NWFZ was discussed in the context of global denuclearization at the third workshop. The 
programs of the three workshops are attached in the appendix of this publication. This 
paper is focused on nuclear issues in NEA, which is important for global nuclear 
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disarmament as well. Accordingly, this paper does not try to propose solutions to resolve all 
security issues in Northeast Asia.
0.4　　Halperin, who proposed the Comprehensive Agreement, has participated in all three 
workshops, which the Nautilus Institute, Hanshin University’s Center for Peace and Public 
Integrity, Mongolian NGO Blue Banner and the Hiroshima Peace Institute cooperated to 
organize. The Nautilus Institute in particular, which has been dedicated to solving North 
Korean security and energy issues and organized the 2011 workshop in Tokyo where Halperin 
initially proposed the Comprehensive Agreement and follow-up workshops in Washington D.C. 
and others, has been a close partner of RECNA’s research project. Its Executive Director, 
Peter Hayes, participated in all three workshops, while Hanshin University’s Center for Peace 
and Public Integrity hosted the second workshop in Seoul. Thus, three workshops have been 
successful due to the participation and cooperation of many individuals and institutions. 
However, RECNA will prepare this proposal, the outcome of the research project, in its own 
capacity and also assume responsibility for all contents herein.
0.5　　The decision to publish this Proposal in 2015 is meaningful. Even though Northeast 
Asia experienced a historic turning point in 1945 when the Asia-Paci c War came to a close, 
remnants of the event continue to cause turmoil in the region. Considering the fact that 2015 
marks the 70
th
 anniversary of the end of the war, the people of the region hope it will herald a 
leap of progress in resolving pending regional issues. Although the Korean Peninsula was 
liberated from Japanese colonial rule in 1945, this year marked the starting point of the 
division that persists today. The nation is yearning for reunification, but military tensions 
between North and South Korea remain unabated and a normal relationship has yet to be 
established between North Korea and Japan and North Korea and the U.S. The year of 1945 
also marked the rst ever wartime use of nuclear bombs, on Nagasaki and Hiroshima. There 
are still many atomic bomb survivors (“hibakusha”) in Japan and Korea who continue to suffer 
from lingering medical aftereffects. Despite advancing years, they continue to appeal to make 
Nagasaki the last place on Earth to have ever experienced a nuclear bombing and realize a 
Nuclear Weapon-Free World. By proposing a comprehensive approach to a NEA-NWFZ, this 
publication wishes to contribute to and capitalize on the 70
th
 anniversary so that it may 




Northeast Asia’s Current State of 
Dependence on Nuclear Weapons
1.1　　This chapter outlines each Northeast Asian country’s current state of dependence on 
nuclear weapons and the influence it has on the international security relationship in the 
region. The four nations in the region subject to this review are Japan, the Republic of Korea 
(South Korea, ROK), the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (North Korea, DPRK) and 
Mongolia. Although Mongolia is also geographically a neighbor to Central Asian nations, with 
which it maintains close relations, the state identifies itself as a nation of Northeast Asia 
(ENKHSAIKHAN 2012). The People’s Republic of China (China) and the Russian Federation 
(Russia) have small portions of territorial areas that fall into the Northeast Asian region and 
the United States of America (U.S.) has military bases located in South Korea and Japan. 
These three nations, all nuclear weapon states under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty 
(NPT), are involved in the nuclear weapons policies of the aforementioned four nations in the 
region. Accordingly, the relationship between these nuclear weapon states and the four NEA 
nations will be examined when necessary. Holistic discussions regarding the international 
security of the region, require discussing hot-button issues such as territorial disputes, 
historical acknowledgements and risks of military balance at an escalated level arising from 
China’s strengthening military capabilities, Japan’s growing military strength and policy and 
the U.S. rebalancing its Asia-Paci c presence. Issues surrounding the denuclearization 
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of Northeast Asia are not entirely unrelated to these aforementioned problems; 
however, as this proposal will demonstrate, the theme of regional denuclearization 
can be pursued relatively independently. Furthermore, solving the nuclear weapons 
issue will boost solving various other international security issues in the region.
1.2　　This chapter concludes that the current state of Northeast Asia’s dependence on 
nuclear deterrence is best described by a picture of North Korea’s nuclear armament policy 
driving Japan and South Korea to intensify their dependence on an extended U.S. nuclear 
deterrent, which, in turn, results in the region remaining in a state of high nuclear 
confrontation. The result is a heightened risk of the tragic scenario of nuclear weapons being 
used, intentionally or accidentally and undermines the international community’s efforts to 
realize a nuclear weapon-free world. It also solidi es and perpetuates the ground for a nuclear 
domino effect, where South Korea and Japan lean toward their own nuclear armament. The 
U.S. extended deterrence however, which is strengthened to cope with the North Korea 
nuclear program, includes not only nuclear but also non-nuclear deterrence (particularly 
missile defense). This shift began with U.S. President Bush’s 2001 “Nuclear Posture Review” 
which introduced “New Triads” (U.S. DOD 2002), which the Obama administration built on in 
the context of “reducing the role of nuclear weapons” in its “Nuclear Posture Review” in 2010 
(U.S. DOD 2010). Given the tremendous destruction that nuclear weapons can cause, 
however, their political signi cance remains relevant, even under extended nuclear deterrence 
with fewer nuclear components, which is why North Korea continues to perceive the U.S. 
extended deterrence as a threat to overthrow its regime. The result is North Korea’s constant 
nuclear weapons policies, in which it aunts its development of nuclear weapons and ballistic 
missiles capabilities as deterrence capabilities to nuclear attacks and as diplomatic cards for 
negotiations to eliminate the threat of being overthrown.
1.3　　Northeast Asia’s dependence on nuclear weapons is characterized by another 
significant trait, which originates from the relationship among the U.S., China and Japan. 
The nuclear tensions between the U.S. and China, meanwhile, arise from opposing global 
strategies. Though initially caused by confrontations regarding the political status of Taiwan, 
modern-day nuclear tensions reflect a fight for hegemony. Conversely, Japan, which chose 
independence under the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty following WWII, made it clear that it will 
protect itself from China’s nuclear force by leveraging the U.S. extended nuclear deterrence, 
after China conducted nuclear tests in 1964. China, however, sees the provision of the U.S. 
extended nuclear deterrence to Japan as intended to work against China to start with. The 
recent Japanese request to strengthen the U.S. extended nuclear deterrence against North 
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Korea has inevitably fueled suggestions that it is also directed at China. Regardless of the fact 
that the U.S. has reduced the role of nuclear weapons in its present-day extended deterrence, 
the situation with China remains unchanged, particularly because the current U.S. extended 
deterrence capabilities, which includes missile defense capabilities as the core component, will 
neutralize, or at least weaken China’s strategic nuclear strength. In this way, even though 
Japan’s response to North Korea’s nuclear development program is regional, the response will 
reawaken global nuclear rivalry and represents another characteristic of the nature of nuclear 
dependence in Northeast Asia, which cannot be ignored. Conversely, if Northeast Asia’s 
current situation of nuclear dependence were transformed through measures allowing the 
extended deterrence to be effectively reduced, it would contribute substantially to global 
nuclear disarmament.
1.4　　North Korea, South Korea and China share concerns over Japan becoming a nuclear 
armed state. In 1990, Major General Stackpole of the U.S. Forces Japan, stated that the role 
of the United States military in Japan, as per the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty, was to act as 
the “cap of a bottle” to prevent Japan from re-emerging as a military superpower. The 
general’s frank statement reflects fear among Japan’s neighboring countries of Japan 
becoming a military superpower and obtaining nuclear arms. The Chinese and South Korean 
governments have questioned Japan’s intentions over its recent stockpiling of plutonium; 
clearly, concerns regarding Japan’s nuclear armament have not faded. With regard to the 
recent debate reviewing Japan’s right to collective self-defense, Professor Joseph Nye pointed 
out that the need for such collective self-defense capabilities must be confirmed and 
emphasized the importance of avoiding antagonism with China and South Korea, who are 
wary of Japan’s right-wing extremism and militarism (NYE 2014). In light of Japan’s current 
situation, there is undeniably concern that Japan could potentially harness its economic, 
technological and industrial capabilities to strengthen its military, including nuclear weapons 
(NAKANO 2014). Considering the fact that North Korea is developing nuclear weapons and 
China expanding its military prowess, experts in the field warn that there is legitimate 
concern over Japan becoming a nuclear armed state if Japan’s trust in the U.S. “Nuclear 
Umbrella” wavers and the nuclear threat in Asia grows (CHOSUN ILBO 2013).
Japan’s Dependence on Nuclear Deterrence
1.5　　As a non-nuclear weapon state, Japan signed the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear 
Weapons Treaty (NPT) in June 1976 and guaranteed the international community that it 
would not possess nuclear weapons. The nuclear bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 
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August 1945 and radiation exposure on tuna shing boats from U.S. hydrogen bomb tests on 
the Bikini Atoll in March 1954 have since cemented opposition to nuclear weapons within 
Japanese civil society. Japan enacted the Atomic Energy Basic Law in 1955 and began 
developing nuclear energy. It reads, “The research, development and utilization of nuclear 
energy shall be limited to peaceful purposes, shall aim to ensure safety and shall be performed 
independently under democratic administration and the results obtained shall be publicized 
so as to actively contribute to international cooperation.” (Article 2) and thus prohibits the 
military use of nuclear energy. When China conducted its nuclear weapon tests in 1964, Japan 
reaffirmed the aforementioned article and decided to rely on the U.S. extended nuclear 
deterrence. This saw Japan adopt three Non-Nuclear Principles stating that “Japan shall 
neither possess, nor manufacture, nor allow the bringing in of nuclear weapons”. In fact, 
during a plenary session of the House of Representatives on January 30, 1968, Prime Minister 
Eisaku Sato introduced the Four-Pillar Nuclear Policy, namely 1) to observe the Three Non-
Nuclear Principles, 2) to work toward global nuclear disarmament, 3) to rely on the U.S. 
nuclear deterrence in accordance with the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty and 4) to promote the 
use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes (SATO 1968). Japan’s current nuclear policies 
generally adhere to this framework. Japan’s new self-defense policies, detailed in the 
“National Defense Program Guideline for FY2014 and beyond”, state that it will be “observing 
the Three Non-Nuclear Principles” and “with regard to the threat of nuclear weapons, the 
extended deterrence provided by the U.S. with nuclear deterrence at its core, is indispensable”. 
As well as confirming policies of dependence on the U.S. extended nuclear deterrence, the 
guideline states “Japan will play a constructive and active role in international nuclear 
disarmament and non-proliferation efforts so as to achieve the long-term goal of creating a 
world free of nuclear weapons” (JAPAN NSC 2013).
1.6　　The United States of America welcomed Japan’s dependence on its extended nuclear 
deterrence, which has repeatedly been guaranteed in multiple mutual agreements. Reviewed 
and updated in 1997, the “Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation” states that “to meet 
its commitments, the United States will maintain its nuclear deterrent capability” (JAPAN-U.
S. SCC 1997). The Japan-U.S. Security Consultative Committee (SCC) met in May 2007 
following North Korea’s first nuclear weapon test. The SCC focused on the U.S. extended 
deterrence in more detail and stated that the “U.S. extended deterrence underpins the defense 
of Japan and regional security. The U.S. reaffirmed that the full range of U.S. military 
capabilities ̶ both nuclear and non-nuclear strike forces and defensive capabilities ̶ form 
the core of extended deterrent and support U.S. commitments to the defense of Japan” 
(JAPAN-U.S. SCC 2007). The second most recent SCC joint statement, ignoring the 
unexpectedly simple 2014 SCC, stated that “the SCC reaffirmed the indispensable role our 
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two countries play in the maintenance of international peace and security and recon rmed our 
Alliance’s commitment to the security of Japan through the full range of U.S. military 
capabilities, including nuclear and conventional” (JAPAN-U.S. SCC 2013). Such statement 
on extended deterrence coincides with the Obama administration’s “Nuclear Posture Review” 
(NPR) of 2010. The NPR states that one of the primary objectives of U.S. nuclear policy should 
be “strengthening regional deterrence and reassuring U.S. allies and partners”. Furthermore, 
U.S. nuclear weapons “contribute to Alliance cohesion and reassure allies and partners who 
feel exposed to regional threats” but that going forward, the fraction of nuclear weapons used 
for nuclear deterrence will be reduced while the percentage of non-nuclear weapons will grow 
(U.S. DOD 2010). Although reducing the percentage of nuclear weapons is a positive step 
forward, the sheer presence of nuclear weapons in Northeast Asia, as was discussed in 
Paragaph 1.2, prevents nuclear tensions from improving. As affirmed in the same NPR 
report, it is important to focus more on the non-military extended deterrence, which means 
deterrence by “non-military – strong, trusting political relationships” (U.S. DOD  2010).
1.7　　Japan has repeatedly stated, directly and indirectly, that it would have to take up 
its own nuclear weapons should trust in U.S. extended nuclear deterrence policies be 
questioned. Regarding the provision of security assurance to North Korea, which was 
expected to be discussed at the rst six-party talks in August 2003, Masashi Nishihara, then 
president of the National Defense Academy of Japan, bluntly opined “Washington should 
not sign a pact stating it has no intention of launching a nuclear attack on North Korea”. He 
went on to declare the possibility of Japanese nuclear armament if “Tokyo could no longer 
rely on its alliance with Washington and thus might decide to develop its own retaliatory 
nuclear weapons” (NISHIHARA 2003). In reference to the Obama administration’s “Nuclear 
Posture Review” (NPR) in 2008, a Japanese media outlet printed that a Japanese 
government representative and specialist was opposed to the U.S. Congressional 
Commission’s proposal to retire the nuclear Tomahawk cruise missile (TLAM/N). Then 
Minister of Foreign Affairs, Katsuya Okada, responded to this issue in January 2010 by 
clarifying that he had written a letter to the U.S. Secretary of State and Secretary of 
Defense in December 2009 that said “if, hypothetically, such a view were expressed, it would 
clearly deviate from my own views, which are in favor of nuclear disarmament” (OKADA 
2009). History suggests that Japan’s government is dependent on and seeks out the U.S. 
extended nuclear deterrenc, which parties in the U.S. have exploited. Such events have also 
resulted in many other nations believing that if Japan’s trust in the U.S. extended nuclear 
deterrence fails, Japan may become a nuclear armed state. As was the case with nuclear 
Tomahawk, the U.S. policies on nuclear weapons reduction was threatened to be derailed by 
Japan’s policy to depend on U.S. nuclear umbrella. Considering the fact that one of the 
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pillars in its Four-Pillar Nuclear Policy involves promoting global nuclear disarmament, this 
situation seems hypocritical.
1.8　　In response to international concerns, Japan adopted a “No Plutonium Surplus 
Policy” in 1991 and to improve transparency, the annual “Plutonium Management Report” has 
published details of Japan’s plutonium stockpile since 1993. The most recent Plutonium 
Management Report published in September 2014 stated that as of the end of December 2013, 
10.8 tons of Japan’s massive 47.8 ton stockpile of plutonium was held domestically and 36.3 
tons in Europe (JAEC 2014). Ever since TEPCO’s (Tokyo Electric Power Company) 
Fukushima Daiichi nuclear disaster in 2011, the use for such large amounts of plutonium has 
remained unclear. Even amid such uncertainty, the new Strategic Energy Plan (JAPAN 
METI 2014) published in April 2014 spells out the policy for “Promotion of the Nuclear Fuel 
Cycle”. International and Japanese specialists have expressed the view that this policy will 
increase the stockpile and adversely impact on international nuclear non-proliferation efforts 
(TAKUBO & VON HIPPEL 2013), (US-JAPAN NUCLER WORKING GROUP 2013). 
These arguments can be broken down into the following:
1.  Lack of Rationale for Nuclear Fuel Cycles: in light of the uncertainty surrounding nuclear 
power plants, continuing nuclear fuel cycles (reprocessing) is irrational.
2.  Concern of “Potential Nuclear Weapon Capabilities”: the lack of rationale suggests that 
Japan is intentionally attempting to gain nuclear weapon capabilities.
3.  Negative impacts on Discouraging Other Nation’s Reprocessing Activities: because Japan 
received complete support from the United States for reprocessing, South Korea has also 
demanded the same in their U.S.-ROK. Civil Nuclear Cooperation Agreement (KOREAN 
JOONGANG DAILY 2014).
4.  The Very Existence of a Plutonium Stockpile Threatens Nuclear Security: stockpiling a 
large volume of plutonium and transporting that stockpile pose a significant nuclear 
security risk.
 In response to such international criticisms, Japan declared in March 2014 that it 
would hand all its plutonium and highly-enriched uranium used at the Fast Critical Assembly 
(FCA) over to the United States and the U.S.-Japan Joint Statement reiterated their 
commitment to the global reduction of special nuclear materials (JAPAN-U.S. LEADERS 
2014). Japan’s plans for using plutonium have, however, remained largely unchanged and 
international tensions regarding the matter remain unresolved.
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South Korea’s Dependence on Nuclear Deterrence
1.9　　According to records by the United States Department of Defense, deployment of 
nuclear bombs and nuclear artillery at U.S. bases in South Korea began in January 1958 
(NORRIS, ARKIN & BURR 1999). It occurred in the course of development of history as 
shown below: The Korean Armistice Agreement was signed in July 1953 for the cease re of 
the Korean War; The Mutual Defense Treaty between the U.S. and the ROK was then signed 
in October the same year and brought into effect in November 1954; The Neutral Nations 
Supervisory Committee was established via the Korean Armistice Agreement, but 
confrontations between the U.S. and Soviet Union diminished its functionality. Nuclear 
weapons deployed in South Korea were aimed at North Korea and it was said that “the only 
place in the world where nuclear weapons face a non-nuclear foe is South Korea” (ARKIN & 
FIELDHOUSE 1985). It has been estimated that there were 660-686 weapons before 1977, 
249 in 1983 and 151 in 1985 (HAYES 1990) at the Kunsan Air Base. Nuclear Weapons 
deployed included nuclear bombs, nuclear artillery, surface-to-surface missiles (Honest John, 
etc.), surface-to-air missiles (Nike-Hercules) and nuclear mines, among others. They were 
deployed in South Korea throughout the Cold War. A major joint military exercise between 
the U.S. and South Korea, dubbed Team Spirit, began in 1976 and was carried out until the 
end of the Cold War. Perceiving each of these exercises as a provocative nuclear war rehearsal, 
North Korea assumed pre-war positions, which sparked further repeated escalations of 
military tensions on the Korean Peninsula. While depending on the U.S. nuclear deterrence, 
including the deployment of the U.S. nuclear weapons on its soil, South Korea internationally 
committed itself to being a non-nuclear state by joining the NPT in April 1975, a year earlier 
than Japan.
1.10　　After the Cold War, in accordance with the so-called Presidential Initiative between 
Bush and Gorbachev, followed by Yeltsin, the U.S. removed all its nuclear weapons from the 
soil of South Korea. In September 1991, President Bush announced that the United States 
would withdraw all land- and sea-based tactical nuclear weapons. The U.S. Department of 
Defense notified North Korea in December the same year that it had removed all nuclear 
weapons from South Korea. South Korean President Roh Tae-woo then declared on December 
18, 1991 that there were no nuclear weapons on the soil of South Korea. According to the 1991 
Command History of the U.S. Paci c Command, which the Nautilus Institute obtained, the 
U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff told the U.S. Paci c Command that the U.S. sealift ships authorized 
to transport nuclear weaponry should be used as a priority to remove nuclear weapons from 
South Korea and that the removal should commence before the U.S.-ROK Military Committee 
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Meeting (MCM) and U.S.-ROK Security Consultative Meeting (SCM) that were scheduled in 
November. These documented records coincide with the sequence of events that are publicly 
known as described above. The global security environment improved when the Cold War 
ended, as exemplified by the withdrawal of U.S. nuclear weapons, which also heralded 
improved inter-Korean relations. In December 1991, the two Koreas signed “The Agreement 
on Reconciliation, Non-aggression, Exchange and Cooperation” followed by the “Joint 
Declaration of South and North Korea on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula” in 
January 1992; two significant agreements which came into effect in February 1992. The 
following statements within the Joint Denuclearization Declaration are of particular 
significance. First and foremost, the preamble of the Joint Statement reads that the 
agreement would “create conditions and an environment favorable to peace and the peaceful 
unification of Korea”; hence, the agreement recognizes the objective of unifying the two 
countries. Article One declares that “South and North Korea shall not test, manufacture, 
produce, receive, possess, store, deploy or use nuclear weapons” and Article Three promises 
“South and North Korea shall not possess nuclear reprocessing and uranium enrichment 
facilities”. Considering that both nations had already signed the NPT, the rst article does not 
state anything new. The third article, however, declaring neither country would produce ssile 
materials, which could potentially be used to develop nuclear weapons, was groundbreaking 
and contrasted with Japan’s progress. The difference between Japan and the two Korea’s 
progress is undeniably stark. Following Japan’s negotiations with the United States, it was 
given permission to fully operate the Tokai Nuclear Processing Plant in 1981. A new Japan-
US Nuclear Cooperation Agreement in 1988 also gave Japan comprehensive consent to build 
and operate the commercial scale Rokkasho Nuclear Fuel Reprocessing Facility for thirty 
years, at which Japan installed a uranium enrichment facility in 1992. The North-South 
Korea Joint Denuclearization Declaration continued to serve a vital role for nuclear 
disarmament negotiations on the Korean Peninsula and in discussions for a NEA-NWFZ.
1.11　　As the South-North Joint Nuclear Control Commission provided for by the Joint 
Denuclearization Declaration failed and North Korea’s nuclear development program 
emerged, South Korea was driven to strengthen diplomatic efforts in cooperation with the 
United States to prevent North Korea’s nuclear program. Simultaneously, South Korea 
strengthened its dependence on the U.S. extended nuclear deterrence. The ROK-U.S. Security 
Consultative Meeting, which has been held annually since 1968, between the U.S. Secretary 
of Defense and South Korea Minister of National Defense has repeatedly reaffirmed the 
United States commitment to extend their “Nuclear Umbrella” to South Korea. A joint 
communiqué from the meeting held in 2006, just ten days after North Korea conducted its 
first nuclear weapon test in October, stated that the U.S. “offered assurances of firm U.S. 
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commitment and immediate support to the ROK, including continuation of the extended 
deterrence offered by the U.S. nuclear umbrella, consistent with the Mutual Defense Treaty” 
(ROK-U.S. SCM 2006). Similar to the extended deterrent provided to Japan, the Obama 
administration emphasized that the U.S. extended deterrent was not limited to nuclear 
deterrence. Furthermore, the 2011 SCM founded the “ROK-U.S. Extended Deterrence Policy 
Committee”. The most recent joint communiqué from 2014 promises to do the following in 
regard to extended deterrence: “The Secretary reaf rmed the continued U.S. commitment to 
provide and strengthen an extended deterrence for the ROK using the full range of military 
capabilities, including the U.S. nuclear umbrella, conventional strike and missile defense 
capabilities” (ROK-U.S. SCM 2014). While there had been a demand in South Korea for 
nuclear sovereignty to secure free hands to develop a nuclear program, North Korea’s 
development of their nuclear program revitalized national nuclear arguments in South Korea. 
Following North Korea’s third nuclear test in February 2013, a survey showed 70% of South 
Koreans supported efforts to develop their own nuclear weapons and some influential 
politicians stated their desire for nuclear armament, which became subject to critical analysis 
(HAYES & MOON 2014). The South Korean President herself expressed concerns about the 
risk of nuclear domino triggered in the ROK (BAKER & GALE 2014). South Korea strongly 
emphasized its desire to amend the ROK-U.S. Atomic Energy Agreement. Rather than a joint 
agreement where South Korea is allowed to reprocess spent nuclear fuels on case-by-case 
basis, South Korea requested a continued “comprehensive consent” clause, similar to that cited 
by Japan, which allowed it to reprocess spent nuclear fuels at will (KANE 2010). The request 
for comprehensive consent in reprocessing spent nuclear fuels was denied and the existing 
nuclear agreement was extended to March 2016 (U.S. DOS 2014). Considering current 
conflicts, such as Japan’s rights to reprocess spent nuclear fuels, this issue is bound to 
resurface.
North Korea’s Nuclear Deterrence Development
1.12　　North Korea’s nuclear weapon program has been developed by primarily using 
plutonium produced at its 5MWe graphite-moderated reactor near Yongbyon. The graphite-
moderated reactor first came online in 1986; a year after North Korea signed the NPT. 
Confrontations over the IAEA’s inspection on the initial declaration by North Korea, as 
required by the NPT, became heated and North Korea announced its withdrawal from the 
NPT in March 1993. The situation led to a rigid U.S.-North Korea Meeting and the 
negotiations shaped the mold for all following meetings regarding North Korea’s nuclear 
program. Held on June 11, 1993, the negotiations concluded and reached agreements that the 
U.S. would provide North Korea with security assurance against the threat and use of force, 
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including nuclear weapons and that the Korean Peninsula would be denuclearized according 
to the Comprehensive Safeguard Agreement, among others. Also agreeing to continue 
negotiations in future, North Korea suspended its decision to withdraw from the NPT 
(PEOPLE’S KOREA 1993). The two core elements of “security assurance to North 
Korea against the threat and use of force, including nuclear weapons” and 
“ ” became a pattern 
that shaped the mold for all following agreements toward denuclearizing North 
Korea. Later negotiations between the U.S. and North Korea, as well as implementing IAEA 
inspections on fuel removal from the graphite reactor, became strained and the multiple 
problems involved saw the situation deteriorate to the brink of war, known as the 1994 crisis. 
Former U.S. President Carter visited North Korea in June 1994 and met with then DPRK 
President Kim Il-sung to mediate a deal to resume talks. Part of the mediated deal was that 
in exchange for North Korea freezing its graphite-moderated reactor and reprocessing 
facilities, high-level talks between the two countries would resume in Geneva. The high-level 
talks in October 1994 created the “Agreed Framework between the United States of America 
and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea” (“Agreed Framework”), according to which the 
Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO) was founded in March 1995.
1.13　　The Agreed Framework called for North Korea to halt all operations at the graphite 
reactor and related facilities in exchange for two 1000 MW light water reactors provided by 
KEDO and a supply of fuel oil as provisional energy aid. In the Agreed Framework, the United 
States guaranteed to refrain from using or threatening to use nuclear weapons against North 
Korea and North Korea would observe the 1992 Joint Denuclearization Declaration, among 
others. It is most notable that on top of security assurances, energy aid was added to 
the negotiating table and negotiations achieved agreement to revitalize the Joint 
Denuclearization Declaration. Founded by an agreement between the United States, 
Japan and South Korea, KEDO’s Executive Board was later joined by the European Union. 
Nine countries, including New Zealand, Australia, Canada and Indonesia, joined KEDO one 
by one from 1995 to 2000. Having multiple countries participate in KEDO strengthened the 
guarantee that North Korea would continue to participate in the process. Furthermore, by 
taking time throughout the process to build mutual trust, this unprecedented, comprehensive 
and ambitious approach targeted efforts to overcome mutual distrust and achieve a nuclear-
free Korean Peninsula. The North Korean ring of the Taepodong ballistic missile in August 
1998 brought with it a new set of problems. In response, the United States assigned former 
Secretary of Defense William Perry as the U.S. North Korea Policy Coordinator to conduct a 
review of the U.S. policy toward North Korea. Perry’s public report, released in October 1999, 
stated that KEDO’s processes had successfully frozen North Korea’s nuclear program. The 
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report also suggested that to maintain the frozen nuclear program, the U.S. take a 
comprehensive and integrated approach to issues while coping with inevitable subsequent 
tensions  (PERRY 1999). The Sunshine Policy adopted in February 1999 by President Kim 
Dae-jung and the Inter-Korean Summit between Kim Dae-jung and Kim Jong-il in June 2000 
paved the way to reaching the pinnacle of KEDO processes in October 2000. Jo Myong-rok, 
who was First Vice-Chairman of the National Defense Commission of North Korea and North 
Korea’s number three, visited Washington and met with President Clinton and Secretary of 
State Madeleine Albright. The DPRK-US Joint Communiqué said that “the two sides stated 
that neither government would have hostile intent toward the other and confirmed the 
commitment of both governments to make every effort in future to build a new relationship 
free from past enmity” (U.S. & DPRK 2000). The United States Congress had consistently 
resisted supplying North Korea with fuel oil. However, it may be safe to say that the KEDO 
process had almost succeeded, despite many twists, turns and challenges along the way. 
Secretary Albright visited Pyongyang ten days later and met with Supreme Leader Kim Jong-
il. KEDO’s processes demonstrated that cooperation among multiple nations and 
improved relations between North and South are crucial in engaging North Korea 
in international efforts.
1.14　　The administration change took place in the U.S. and when President G. H. Bush 
labeled North Korea the “Axis of Evil” in his State of the Union address in January 2002, it 
toppled the already wobbly balance of denuclearization negotiations in the Korean Peninsula. 
Suspicions of North Korea enriching uranium terminated KEDO’s processes in October 2002 
and North Korea announced its withdrawal from the NPT in January 2003. Although there 
were objections to the validity of the withdrawal procedure taken by the DPRK, the three-
month cooling-off period expired and North Korea withdrew. Within this timeframe, the U.S. 
began the Iraq War after having labeled Hussein’s regime the “Axis of Evil”, just as it had 
done to North Korea. It is presumed that these developments largely in uenced North Korea’s 
subsequent national strategy. In an effort to bring North Korea back to the negotiating table 
to peacefully resolve nuclear issues, China initiated the Six-Party Talks in August 2003, 
which involved China, North Korea, Japan, South Korea, Russia and the U.S.. Through 
December 2008 there were six rounds and thirteen official Six-Party Talks sessions, with 
details of the talks found in Box 1. When North Korea conducted its rst underground nuclear 
weapon test during the Six-Party Talks in 2006, it appeared North Korea was adopting 
diplomacy that attempted to eliminate the threat against its regime and normalize 
international relations by playing both the processes and products of developing 
nuclear deterrence as diplomatic cards. One key negotiator stated ̶ in retrospect ̶ 
they should have recognized that in light of North Korea’s nuclear test, it would take time to 
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achieve nuclear disarmament and negotiations should have proceeded with a long-term 
perspective (PRITCHARD 2007).
1.15　　The Six-Party Talks agreed on the September 19 Joint Statement in 2005, which 
included commitments to security assurances (including conventional weapons) and 
elements from the Agreed Framework, such as the 1992 Joint Declaration and provision of 
energy assistance. In addition, it also included new elements such as the agreement for North 
Six-Party Talk Timeline
August 27-29, 2003: First Round
The party con rmed to work to resolve North Korea’s nuclear issue through 
peaceful means.
February 25-28, 2004: Second Round
Followed by two working group meetings, all parties reaf rmed the objective 
of achieving a nuclear-weapons-free Korean Peninsula. The U.S. demanded 
a CVID (“complete, veri able, and irreversible dismantlement”)  
June 23-26 2004: Third Round  
There was disparity between North Korea and the U.S., South Korea, and 
Japan regarding the range, verification, and compensation for freezing 
North Korea’s nuclear program as an initial step for dismantling North 
Korea’s nuclear weapons. 
July 26-August 7, 2004: Fourth Round First Session
All concerned nations agreed on signi cant principles to establish nuclear 
free Korean Peninsula, normalize Japan-North Korea and U.S.-North Korea 
diplomatic relations, provide economic and energy assistance, and outline 
the “Safety Guarantee” document. The meeting adjourned and a consensus 
could not be reached regarding North Korea’s rights for peaceful use of 
nuclear power and its uranium enrichment facility. 
September 13-19, 2005: Fourth Round, Second Session
The parties released its first joint statement on September 19
th
. The 
statement con rms to denuclearize the Korean Peninsula through a peaceful 
and veri able manner, to respect North Korea’s rights for peaceful use of 
nuclear energy, to provide North Korea with a light water nuclear reactor, 
to normalize the diplomatic relations between Japan-North Korea, U.
S-North Korea, and to stabilize North Korea through economy/energy aids.
November 9-11, 2005: Fifth Round, First Session
The parties had detailed discussions on how the to implement the Joint 
Statement, but adjourned without reaching a consensus because North 
Korea opposed U.S. nancial sanctions. (During this meeting, North Korea 
conducted missile tests and its rst nuclear experiment.)
December 18-22, 2006: Fifth Round, Second Session
A work plan submitted by China, the chairperson, was discussed. The 
meeting adjourned with disagreement from North Korea, which demanded 
the U.S. to terminate its nancial sanctions on North Korea. 
Box 1
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February 8-13, 2007: Fifth Round, Third Session
The parties agreed on “First Phase Actions” to shut down and seal the 
nuclear facilities around Yongbyon. In exchange, the parties would provide 
North Korea with fuel oil, and aid to its economy, energy, and human 
resources. The parties created five working groups, which are as follows: 
“Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula (Chairperson: China)”, “Economy 
and Energy Cooperation (Chairperson: South Korea)”, “Normalization of 
Japan-North Korea Diplomatic Relations (Chairperson: U.S./North Korea)”, 
“Normalization of U.S.-North Korea Diplomatic Relations (Chairperson: 
U.S./North Korea) and “Northeast Asia Peace and Security Mechanism 
(Chairperson; Russia)”.
March 19-22, 2007: Sixth Round, First Session
The five working groups established during the Fifth Round reported on 
their progress. North Korea refused to substantiate negotiations due to U.S. 
nancial sanctions and the meeting was adjourned. 
July 18-20, 2007: Sixth Round, Head of Delegation Meeting
North Korea halted operations of the Yongbyon nuclear facilities and it was 
found that the IAEA had begun operations in North Korea. Agreements 
were not reached regarding the “Second Phase Actions”.
September 27-30, 2007: Sixth Round, Second Session
To achieve the September 19
th
 Joint Statement, the parties agreed on the 
second phase of actions for a nuclear-free Korean Peninsula, normalizing 
diplomatic relations between the parties, and the provision of economic & 
energetic aid to North Korea (dated October 3).
July 10-12 2008: Sixth Round, Second Head of Delegation Meeting
The parties agreed on the need of a verification mechanism to verify the 
denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula and a monitoring mechanism to 
monitor each party state ’s fulfillment of and respect towards the 
commitment. Agreements were also reached towards disabling the Yongbyon 
nuclear facilities, providing economic and energy aid, stabilizing the region, 
and holding ministerial conference. An unof cial six-party meeting was later 
held in Singapore on July 23
rd
, where the U.S. removed North Korea from its 
list of state sponsors of terrorism (October 10). 
December 8-10, 2008: Sixth Round, Third Head of Delegation Meeting
Japan, U.S., South Korea and Russia could not reach a consensus with 
North Korea in terms of a veri cation system. This has been the last Six-
Party Talk as of January 2015. 
Korea to rejoin the NPT and the need for consultation among the parties concerned to promote 
lasting peace and stability in the Korean Peninsula (SIX-PARTY TALKS 2005). The 
September 19 Joint Statement is still cited as a key international agreement regarding the 
denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula (for instance NPT 2010-8). Based upon the Joint 
Statement, the Six-Party agreed to the initial phase actions to freeze North Korea’s three 
Yongbyon facilities (the 5 MWe Graphite Reactor, the Reprocessing Plant or Radiochemical 
Laboratory and the Nuclear Fuel Fabrication Facility) in February 2007. The party also 
established five working groups. One group deserving of attention is the “Northeast Asia 
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Peace and Security Mechanism Working Group” (SIX-PARTY TALKS 2007-1). It deserves 
attention for its potential as a platform for a more comprehensive consultation on regional 
security, including the establishment of an NWFZ in Northeast Asia. The Six-Party Talks also 
agreed on the second phase of action in October the same year, while the two primary actions 
were “the disablement of the three Yongbyon facilities” and “a complete and correct declaration 
of all nuclear programs of North Korea” (SIX-PARTY TALKS  2007-2). North Korea made a 
public demonstration of demolishing the cooling tower of the graphite reactor in June 2008 to 
fulfill part of the disablement action. According to a U.S. Congressional Research Service 
Report, the disablement proceeded in eleven phases, which were 80% complete as of April 
2009 (NIKITIN 2013). However, the Six-Party Talks became deadlocked over the process of 
verifying the “complete and correct declaration” by North Korea. The Heads of Delegation 
meeting of the Six-Party Talks held in December 2008 was the party’s last talk. Although 
issues of verifying North Korea’s nuclear program could have been given more time and 
passed to “third-phase actions”, the challenges arising from a possible U.S. administration 
change seem to have posed dif culties.
1.16　　In April 2009, North Korea publicly announced its launch of Juche Nuclear 
Industry and the decision to build an experimental light water reactor in Yongbyon (KCNA 
2009-2), then to begin enriching uranium as fuel for the reactor (KCNA  2009-4). Siegfried 
Hecker, a former Director of the Los Alamos National Laboratory and other U.S. experts were 
invited to view the Yongbyon facilities in November 2010 (HECKER 2010). They found a 
10MWt small, light water reactor in its initial construction stage and a surprisingly modern 
centrifuge cascade facility, as commented by Hecker, to enrich uranium. According to him, 
North Korean experts explained the enrichment facilities were up and running and they were 
intending to make up a six-stage cascade with 2000 centrifuges to enrich uranium and 
produce uranium dioxide fuel, although they had yet to acquire such technology. North 
Korea’s regime passed to Kim Jong-un in December 2011, yet the national strategy of striving 
to gain nuclear deterrence, as a means of regime protection, has remained unchanged. In April 
2013, the Supreme People’s Assembly adopted the “Law on Consolidating the Position of a 
Nuclear Weapons State”, which set forth policies regarding nuclear weapons and a doctrine for 
the use of such weapons (KCNA 2013-6). The doctrine declares that the Supreme Commander 
of the Korean People’s Army is authorized to give the order to use nuclear weapons only when 
waging war against an invading nuclear weapon state and that North Korea will not threaten 
to use or use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapon states, unless they have joined a 
hostile nuclear enemy who attacks North Korea. The doctrine continues to state North Korea 
will observe strict rules on the security management of nuclear weapons and will not let 
nuclear weapons, technology or nuclear substances be smuggled out, etc. Reliable con rmation 
37
that North Korea has successfully weaponized a nuclear bomb, however, remains pending. In 
April the same year, North Korea announced that the Yongbyon graphite reactor had resumed 
operations (KCNA 2013-7) and satellite imagery taken in August showed expanded uranium 
enrichment facilities (ALBRIGHT & AVAGYAN 2013). Further analysis of North Korea’s 
recent activities, including details of their nuclear capabilities, can be found in Chapter 4.
Mongolia’s Nuclear-Weapon-Free Status
1.17　　Sandwiched between two massive countries with nuclear weapons ̶ Russia and 
China ̶ Mongolia has received international recognition thanks to its unique “Single State 
Nuclear Weapon-Free Status”. Following the end of the Cold War, in February 1992, the 
“Mongolian People’s Republic” was renamed “Mongolia” under a new constitution, In October 
the same year, then President Ochirbat stated in his address to the United Nations that 
Mongolia had declared its territory a nuclear-weapon-free zone, to contribute toward regional 
and global disarmament and trust (OCHIRBAT 1992). On that note, the president went on to 
say that the Cold War had eroded national independence and sovereignty and that the 
conclusion of the Cold War gave nations like Mongolia high expectations of the new era ̶ 
particularly that which was spelled out in the United Nations Charter. The Mongolian nuclear 
weapon-free declaration re ected the new Mongolian government’s strategy founded at a time 
of change (ENKHSAIKHAN 2014). In December 1998, the United Nations General Assembly 
resolution titled “Mongolia’s International Security and Nuclear-Weapon-Free Status” (A/
RES/53/77) was adopted without a vote. This was a welcome response to Mongolia’s own 
declaration and also recognized that such effort would contribute to the peace, safety and 
stability of the region. Furthermore, Mongolia legislation adopted the “Law of Mongolia on its 
Nuclear-Weapon-Free Status” in February 2000 (UNGA 2000). This law prohibited any 
individual, legal entity, or state from developing, acquiring, possessing, deploying, or 
transporting nuclear weapons, etc. on the territory of Mongolia. It is also notable that the 
same law also allows NGOs and individuals to exercise “public oversight” in implementing 
legislation regarding the nuclear-weapon-free status.
1.18　　The largest challenge in maintaining Mongolia’s “Single State Nuclear Weapon-
Free Zone” is to secure a legally binding security assurance from states with nuclear weapons. 
In response to Mongolia’s request, ve nuclear weapon states ̶ the P5 ̶ expressed a joint 
statement in October 2000 titled: “Statement on Security Assurances in Connection with 
Mongolia’s Nuclear-Weapon-Free Status”. Although the statement reaffirmed the political 
intent from the P5 to refrain from using or threatening to use nuclear weapons against 
38
Mongolia, it fell short of offering Mongolia legally binding security assurance. A UN-
sponsored, non-governmental group meeting of experts was held in September 2001 in 
Sapporo, which involved individual experts from the P5 and Mongolia examining various 
models ranging from “minimal model” to “comprehensive model”. The former model was 
limited to a trilateral treaty between China, Mongolia and Russia that would agree to prohibit 
“deploying, storing, or passing nuclear explosive devices through Mongolian territory”. The 
latter model required the participation of the ve nuclear weapon states, dealing with a wide-
range of threats to Mongolia’s national security (UMEBAYASHI 2011). Mongolia’s diplomatic 
efforts toward the P5 continued hereafter and declarations were announced in October 2012 to 
reaf rm the P5 joint statement on security assurances (UNGA-UNSC 2012). However, this - 
once again - fell short of a legally binding framework (UMEBAYASHI 2014-1). Mongolia’s 
national government has of cially committed its position in backing a NEA-NWFZ. During 
the United Nations High-Level Panel on September 26, 2013, Mongolian President Elbegdorj 
declared his intent to work with the countries of Northeast Asia in evaluating the potential to 
make the NEA-NWFZ a reality on an informal basis (ELBEGDORJ 2013). Mongolia plays a 
signi cant role in efforts to establish a NEA-NWFZ.
39
Chapter 2
Demand from the Global Nuclear 
Disarmament Objective
2.1　　The proliferation of nuclear weapons and the reinforcement of nuclear weapon 
dependency in Northeast Asia goes directly against the tide of the world striving for a “world 
without nuclear weapons”, as driven by President Obama’s Prague speech. Following the 
Prague speech, the 2010 NPT Review Conference’s Final Document included adopting a 
64-point “Action Plan”, which was the rst step toward success. The Final Document included 
phrases such as “nuclear weapons convention” and “agreement on a framework of separate, 
mutually reinforcing instruments”, etc. It further provided crucial instructions by stating that 
the NPT “affirms that all States need to make special efforts to establish the necessary 
framework to achieve and maintain a world without nuclear weapons” (NPT 2010-2) and 
“expresses its deep concern at the catastrophic humanitarian consequences of any use of 
nuclear weapons” (NPT 2010-1). The review conference also promised speci c action plans to 
“rapidly move toward an overall reduction in the global stockpile of all types of nuclear 
weapons” (NPT 2010-5) and “further diminish the role and signi cance of nuclear weapons in 
all military and security concepts, doctrines and policies” (NPT 2010-6). The Final Document’s 
action calling for “all States and parties to commit to pursuing policies that are fully 
compatible with the Treaty and the objective of achieving a world without nuclear weapons” 
(NPT 2010-3) is a reminder that both nuclear weapon and non-nuclear weapon states are 
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both responsible for achieving the goals set forth. This call for action epitomizes what needs to 
be done to achieve a NEA-NWFZ.
2.2　　Even though the Conference on Disarmament (CD) ̶ the only disarmament 
negotiation forum ̶ has stalled, there have been increasing efforts to establish platforms to 
negotiate “the necessary framework to achieve and maintain a world without nuclear 
weapons”. Austria, Mexico and Norway submitted their “Taking Forward Multilateral Nuclear 
Disarmament Negotiations” resolution to the United Nations General Assembly First 
Committee in 2011 (AUSTRIA, MEXICO & NORWAY 2011). This resolution reworks the 
CD’s four main agendas into two categories and tried to bring the long-standing confrontation 
regarding the priority of issues to an end. The three countries determined, however, that the 
resolution would nd it dif cult to attract widespread support and it was withdrawn. Named 
after a December 2012 resolution of the same title, an “open-ended working group (OEWG) to 
develop proposals to take forward multilateral nuclear disarmament negotiations to achieve 
and maintain a world without nuclear weapons” was established. The OEWG convened for 
fteen days at the United Nations Headquarters in Geneva over the course of three sessions 
held in May, June and August 2013, at which government of cials, international institutions, 
experts and NGOs freely exchanged ideas. The OEWG was concluded on August 30 after 
manifesting a report “Discussions and proposals” chapter (OEWG 2013). According to Article 
VI of the NPT Treaty, all nations must bear responsibility for nuclear disarmament. In 
addition, the OEWG report introduced a new concept that “states have differentiated roles 
and functions” to ful ll this responsibility. The group added that “non-nuclear-weapon States 
have a role in promoting global nuclear disarmament”. The OEWG report then introduces the 
“role of non-nuclear weapons States under extended nuclear deterrence guarantees” in 
“reducing the salience of nuclear weapons in security doctrines”. The report also stressed the 
role played by “nuclear-weapon-free zones in challenging the value and legitimacy of nuclear 
weapons” (See Box 2 for more information about the existing nuclear weapon-free zones in the 
world). The context of the OEWG report implies that if states dependent on extended 
nuclear deterrence select policies for a NEA-NWFZ, it would be a step forward in 
global nuclear disarmament.
2.3　　Spurred on by the 2010 NPT Review Conference’s Final Document, an approach to 
push the stalled nuclear disarmament discussion forward has prioritized the “Humanitarian 
Consequences of Nuclear Weapons”. This discussion focuses on the signi cance of problems 
stemming from extended nuclear deterrence. The joint statement released in May 2012 during 
the 1
st
 Preparatory Committee for 2015 NPT Review Conference initially had 16 signatory 
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Existing Nuclear Weapon-Free Zones in the world
What are Nuclear Weapon-Free Zones?
 NWFZs are an international legal scheme whereby a geographical area is created in 
which no nuclear weapons exist. The significance of this scheme is not only to prohibit the 
development, manufacture, and deployment of nuclear weapons within the zone, but also to 
make nuclear-possessing states commit to not using or threatening to use nuclear weapons 
against the states within the zone (provision of “negative security assurance”). NWFZs can also 
serve as an effective con dence-building measure among regional states and concerned states, 
as well as to contribute as important regional efforts to creating norms toward the global 
prohibition of nuclear weapons. 
 There are ve existing NWFZs, and each one is stipulated by an international treaty. 
The Antarctic Treaty is a kind of NWFZ treaty. In addition, Mongolia’s nuclear-weapon-free 
status has been recognized by the international community. 
 There are three characteristic in common among the existing NWFZs. The rst is the 
“nonexistence of nuclear weapon.” In these zones, the acquisition, possession, deployment, 
testing and use of nuclear weapons are prohibited. Secondly, in concept, security assurances 
are provided by the nuclear weapon states. This means that the use or threat to use of nuclear 
weapons against countries within the zones is prohibited. Moreover, regional organizations 
established in conjunction with NWFZ Treaties can contribute to strengthening mutual 
con dence by solving regional disputes and problems such as non-compliance with the treaty in 
a regional and peaceful manner. In addition to the above, the right of the States Parties to use 
nuclear energy peacefully is often stipulated in NWFZ Treaties. 
①  Treaty for the Prohibit ion of Nuclear 
Weapons in Latin America and Caribbean 
(Treaty of Tlatelolco)
● Opened for signature: February 14, 1967
● Entered into force: April 25,1969
● Number of states parties:33 
　(including all nations in the region)
② South Pacific Nuclear Free-Zone Treaty 
　(Treaty of Rarotonga)
● Opened for signature: August 6,1985
● Entered into force: December 11,1986
● Number of states parties:13
③  Treaty on the Southeast Asia Nuclear-
Weapon-Free Zone (Treaty of Bangkok)
● Opened for signature: December 15,1995
● Entered into force: March 27, 1997
● Number of states parties:10 
　(including all nations in the region)
④  African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty 
(Treaty of Pelindaba)
●Opened for signature: April 11,1996
●Entered into force: July 15,2009
●  Number of signatory states:50, Number of state 
parties:39 
⑤  Treaty on a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone in 
Central Asia
● Opened for signature: September 8, 2006
● Entered into force: March 21, 2009
● Number of states parties:5 
　(including all nations in the region)
⑥Mongolia’s Nuclear-Weapon-Free Status
●  On December 4,1998, the United Nations 
General Assembly recognized its nuclear-
weapon-free status by adopting the resolution 
submitted by Mongolia.
●  On February 3,2000, the Law of Mongolia on its 
nuclear-weapon-free status was adopted.
⑦ The Antarctic Treaty
● Opened for signature: December 1, 1959
● Entered into force: June 23,1961
● Number of states parties:50 
　(including 5 nuclear weapon states)
Box 2
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states, including Norway, Switzerland and Austria and has since continued to gain support. 
The fth “Joint Statement on Humanitarian Consequences of Nuclear Weapons”, announced 
in 2014 during the UN General Assembly First Committee, saw 155 states sign. In parallel to 
the joint statement gaining support, a “Conference on the Humanitarian Impact of Nuclear 
Weapons” was held in March 2013, February 2014 and December 2014 in Oslo Norway, 
Nayarit Mexico and Vienna Austria, respectively. In connection to the extended nuclear 
deterrence, the attitudes of the Japanese government toward these developments have caught 
attention. Japan had not signed the first three joint statements, but finally did so for the 
fourth joint statement in October 2013. The joint statement says that “it is in the interest of 
the very survival of humanity that nuclear weapons are never used again, under any 
circumstances”, which can be interpreted as a de facto declaration of the non-use of nuclear 
weapons. Heightened domestic public opinion shifted Japan’s attitude toward supporting the 
statement. Meanwhile, it became apparent that certain non-nuclear weapon states attempted 
to restrain the developing discussion on the inhumanity of nuclear weapons. Japan supported 
the joint statement delivered by Australia, which emphasized the need to “address the 
important security and humanitarian dimensions of nuclear weapons.” Analyzing this 
response objectively, it is contradictory to emphasize the impact on humanity that 
using nuclear weapons could have while refusing to commit not to use the same. 
This contradiction can be resolved by shifting current security policies in favor of 
those which eliminate the very possibility of using nuclear weapons. One of the 
alternative policy options to this situation will pave the way for a nuclear weapon-
free zone.
2.4　　The statement to require to “rapidly move toward an overall reduction in the global 
stockpile,” which appeared in NPT documents and elsewhere, not only puts the spotlight on 
the U.S. and Russia to reduce their nuclear arsenal, but also intends to reemphasize the 
commitment “to undertake further efforts to reduce and ultimately eliminate all types of 
nuclear weapons, deployed and non-deployed”. Furthermore, instead of focusing solely on 
disarming nuclear weapon hardware, the need “to further diminish the role and signi cance of 
nuclear weapons in all military and security concepts, doctrines and policies” has been also 
discussed. This reveals the need to pursue manifesting a transparent and veri able “Report” 
on the various soft and hard aspects of nuclear disarmament. The 2010 NPT Review 
Conference Final Document lists concrete measures toward nuclear disarmament which 
should be taken by nuclear weapon states. It also urges nuclear weapon states to adopt a 
standard reporting form to submit a report regarding their implementation of these measures 
(NPT 2010-4), (NPT 2010-7). The “Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative” (NPDI), 
founded by Japan and Australia, submitted a working paper to the First Session of the 
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Preparatory Committee in 2012. The submission, titled “Transparency of nuclear weapons: 
the Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative” (NPDI), introduced a “Standard Reporting 
Form” (NPDI 2012). On top of reporting on the production of ssile material and the number, 
type and deployment status of nuclear warheads and delivery vehicles, the form would have 
states report on the past year’s “measures taken to diminish the role and significance of 
nuclear weapons in military and security concepts, doctrines and policies”. South Africa 
represented the New Agenda Coalition (NAC) at the First Session of the Preparatory 
Committee and expanded on the aforementioned measures. The NAC stated that nuclear 
weapon states and their nuclear weapon-free alliances must report on the instruments and 
plans to diminish the role of nuclear weapons (MABHONGO 2012). This trend demonstrates 
that we have reached a point where 
the part of states dependent on extended nuclear deterrence to eliminate 
dependence on nuclear weapons.
2.5　　As demonstrated above, recent global disarmament discussions demand that 
non-nuclear weapon states, particularly those dependent on extended nuclear 
deterrence, make policy changes. Considering the clear impact using nuclear weapons 
would have on humanity, North Korea must halt its nuclear weapons program and Japan and 
South Korea must alter their nuclear weapon dependence policies. It goes without saying that 
if these states feel threatened by nuclear weapons, then policies guaranteeing security should 
address the matter. To formulate and achieve comprehensible policies, states within the 
potential NEA-NWFZ must continue efforts to achieve the NWFZ. For example, South Korea 
and Japan can illegitimatize nuclear weapons by establishing policies that eliminate 
dependence on the nuclear umbrella, which would contribute signi cantly to improving the 
norms to prohibiting nuclear weapons from the region and beyond. This would also contribute 
to global nuclear disarmament. Japan, which is the only nation to have experienced atomic 
bombings in wartime, in Nagasaki and Hiroshima, should reaf rm its responsibility to ll the 
role of leading international nuclear disarmament and work with Korea, which is also home to 
many nuclear bomb victims. The two nations can collaborate to select policies that move 
toward a NEA-NWFZ, and now have the opportunity to make a large, international impact. 




The Significance of a Northeast Asia 
Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone 
and the Halperin Proposal
3.1　　As was introduced in Paragraphs 1.2 and 1.3, North Korea’s developing nuclear 
weapons program intensi ed Japan and South Korea’s dependence on nuclear deterrence and 
has heightened the region’s nuclear confrontation. Anxieties over a nuclear domino effect in 
Japan and South Korea cannot be ignored. As well as increasing the risk of nuclear war, the 
current situation heightens the psychological sense of being threatened, which leads to rising 
military tensions and the risk of not only nuclear but also conventional military confrontation. 
Although it is welcome that the United States has reduced the role of nuclear weapons in its 
extended deterrence, this change in policy will not reduce the aggressive mindset in the 
current nuclear confrontation as long as any trace of nuclear weapons is involved. The result 
is overall security instability in the region. The region’s escalating nuclear dependence runs 
counter to the international community’s goal of achieving a “Nuclear Weapon-Free World”. It 
also extraordinarily diminishes the role to be played by Japan, as the only country to have 
experienced nuclear bombings, in promoting global nuclear disarmament. The situation would 
be further complicated should Japan, South Korea and the U.S. respond militarily with a joint 
missile defense program to the assumption that North Korea’s developing ballistic missile 
program implies a development in their nuclear weapons program. Because such missile 
defense capability would theoretically also diminish the effectiveness of the Chinese strategic 
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nuclear forces. This is an example of how regional tensions stemming from North Korea’s 
nuclear weapons program impede global nuclear disarmament efforts. Achieving a NEA-
NWFZ will lay the groundwork for a regional security system that eliminates such tensions. 
As part of the international community’s nuclear disarmament efforts, non-nuclear weapon 
states dependent on extended nuclear deterrent are demanded to act as mentioned in 
Chapter 2. The NEA-NWFZ initiative would serve as an example from Japan and South 
Korea to respond to such a call.
3.2　　Since the end of the Cold War, various concrete proposals have been made to achieve 
an NEA-NWFZ as a step forward in establishing regional security. Box 3 shows a list 
representing such proposals, organized by year. At present, the Three-plus-Three 
Arrangement, including its various modi cations, is considered a simple and pragmatic basic 
structure. A model treaty has been drafted based on this arrangement (UMEBAYASHI 2005). 
In the NEA-NWFZ treaty with the Three-plus-Three Arrangement, the three states involved, 
namely South and North Koreas and Japan are categorized as “Intrazonal States” and the 
other three states involved, the U.S., Russia and China, all of which are nuclear weapon states 
under NPT with deep ties to the region, are categorized as “Neighboring Nuclear Weapon 
States”. The Intrazonal States would form a geographic nuclear weapon-free zone and be 
required to assume non-nuclear obligations similar to existing NWFZ treaties. A Neighboring 
Nuclear Weapon State would become a full state party of the treaty, as opposed to a party of 
its protocol and assume the obligation to refrain from committing any acts against the non-
nuclear provisions of the treaty and provide security assurances not to attack the zone with 
nuclear weapons, hopefully even with conventional weapons (negative security assurances). If 
Mongolia, which has received UN General Assembly recognition for its nuclear weapon-free 
status, were to opt for membership of an NEA-NWFZ, a Four-plus-Three Arrangement 
would be optimal. However, as was shown in Paragraphs 1.17 & 1.18, it entirely depends 
upon the choice of Mongolia’s diplomatic strategies in the post-2012 era. No doubt it is 
necessary for the zone to receive negative security assurances from all ve nuclear weapon 
states. In this scheme, France and England, which are not “Neighboring Nuclear Weapon 
States”, would be requested to provide such security assurances through a protocol of the 
treaty. It will be appropriate from the geographical perspective to have the U.S., Russia and 
China all directly involved in the treaty. It is no accidental coincidence that all states of the 
Three-plus-Three Arrangement are members of the Six-party Talks.
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Proposals on a Northeast Asia Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone
Date, Year Submitted by Proposal Contents
March, 1995 John Endicott, et al.
Limited Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone (LNWFZ), 
involving only non-strategic weapons. A Circular 
Zone with 2000 km radius centered on Panmunjom 
and later an elliptical zone to include part of Alaska, 
U.S..
1995 Andrew Mack NWFZ involving the ROK, DPRK, Japan and Taiwan.
March, 1996 Kumao Kaneko
A Circular Zone with 2000 km radius centered on 
Panmunjom. Different obligations posed on nuclear 
weapons state and non-nuclear weapons states.
May, 1996 Hiromichi Umebayashi
Three plus Three nations arrangement involving 
ROK, DPRK and Japan as non-nuclear weapons 




John Endicott, et al.
Northeast Asia League of Non-Nuclear States, 
involving the ROK, Japan and Mongolia (and DPRK 
if possible) as a phase I formation of the LNWFZ.
December, 
2003
Seongwhun Cheon, Tatsujiro 
Suzuki
Proposal of a concept for a tri-party treaty between 
Japan, ROK, and DPRK to achieve long-term goals 
set at the six-party talks.
April, 2004 Hiromichi Umebayashi, et al.
A model NWFZ treaty with six nations, drafted based 
upon a Three plus Three nations arrangement.
Spring 2007 J. Enkhsaikhan
An approach to form a zone through relevant non-
nuclear constituent states’ attaining single state 
NWF status.
August, 2008
Democratic Party of Japan 
Disarmament Group





Adding protocols for the multilateralization of the 
Joint Declaration for the Denuclearization of the 
Korean Peninsula
May, 2010
Peter Hayes, et al. 
(Nautilus Institute)
Idea for initially forming then expanding a NWFZ 




An approach to conclude a comprehensive agreement 
on key elements including the establishment of a 




Peter Hayes, et al. 
(Nautilus Institute)
An approach beyond the Six-Party Talks where 
Japan, ROK, DPRK, Mongolia, and Canada form a 
NWFZ and involves the five nuclear-weapon states. 




3.3　　In 2011, Halperin proposed achieving an NEA-NWFZ as an element of a 
“Comprehensive Agreement on Peace and Security in Northeast Asia” (HALPERIN  2011, 
2012, 2014). Signi cantly, it shifted the framework of the arguments on an NEA-NWFZ from 
scheme-centered (focused on the geographic scope) to approach-centered (focused on the 
process to achieve) arguments. Halperin’s proposal carried weight for several reasons; he used 
to work in formulating U.S. policies toward Asia at several U.S. administrations; the U.S. has 
been considered by the DPRK as the primary source of national threats that prompt it to 
develop nuclear deterrence; and therefore the U.S. has been a state with which North Korea 
wants to negotiate. The Halperin Proposal was shared and backed at the First Workshop for 
the following reasons (RECNA 2013). 1) Accepting North Korea’s possession of nuclear 
weapons as a fait accompli may potentially lead to a domino effect in Japan and South Korea, 
which could then trigger the collapse of the international non-proliferation regime. 2) 
Accordingly, robust international efforts, which should be tangible and verifiable, should 
continue as long as hope remains, however minute, that North Korea can be denuclearized. 3) 
Past efforts to denuclearize North Korea have stalled. A new approach for negotiations is 
needed to avoid repeating past failures, which involve placing blame on one another for the 
reason negotiations failed. 4) Although there is a need for a comprehensive approach that 
simultaneously solves pending issues, this approach should not attempt to solve all the 
region’s security issues at the same time. Rather, it should be a restrained approach that 
comprehensively solves issues directly related to regional nuclear issues. As such, the 
Halperin Proposal is uniquely valuable and criticisms on it for repeating and rehashing other 
comprehensive proposals will not t (e.g. GREEN 2012).
3.4　　There are six primary elements in Halperin’s proposal for a comprehensive security 
agreement. As Kurosawa pointed out, although details of each element have been slightly 
altered, there have been no major changes since the initial introduction in 2011 
(KUROSAWA 2014). The six elements are: 1) Termination of the State of War, 2) 
Creation of a Permanent Council on Security, 3) Mutual Declaration of No Hostile 
Intent, 4) Provisions of Assistance for Nuclear and Other Energy, 5) Termination of 
Sanctions and 6) Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone. In recent years, North Korea has 
repeatedly expressed its desire to achieve the first element. There have been various 
suggestions for the process to convert the Korean War Armistice Agreement into a peace 
treaty and the details to be included in the peace treaty, but Halperin does not delve into this. 
However, he does mention that South Korea should be involved in the treaty, as well as the 
three armistice nations. The role of the second element̶a permanent council̶would, 
naturally, be to implement the agreement’s provisions. However, there have been no detailed 
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discussion regarding whether the council should handle broader security issues in the region. 
This council would also include more countries than those in the Six-Party Talks. The 
declaration of no hostile intent (third element) is reminiscent of the U.S.-DPRK Joint 
Communiqué that took place in 2000 (Paragraph 1.13, U.S. & DPRK 2000). There were no 
details regarding what the mutual declaration between other nations would be. Just as 
previously, there is a need to provide North Korea with energy assistance. The fourth point, 
however, emphasizes that limiting North Korea’s access to nuclear energy is discriminatory 
and cannot be allowed. The fth element prohibits nations in the comprehensive agreement 
from individually placing sanctions on one another due to nuclear issues. However, the treaty 
should have provisions to allow sanctions to be imposed on states that violate the treaty. 
Halperin does not make any suggestions on how to lift sanctions currently placed by the UN 
Security Council resolutions. There are many details in the proposal regarding the sixth 
NWFZ element. While retaining the basic Three-plus-Three Arrangement, Halperin suggests 
the possibility of inviting Mongolia and Canada, as non-nuclear weapon states and France and 
the U.K. as nuclear weapon states, to the treaty. Further, there are provisions for North Korea 
to dismantle its nuclear arsenal and thoughts on how to handle remaining nuclear weapons 
should Korea be reunified before completing the dismantlement. Halperin also devises an 
entry-into-force provision to increase the incentives for North Korea to join the treaty and 
provisions for the transition period. He also examines the possible entry-into-force provisions 
for Japan and South Korea to feel more secured in joining the treaty (HALPERIN 2014). 
Details regarding this are discussed in Chapter 5. If an NEA-NWFZ is established by solving 
these six elements, it could be a catalyst toward constructive discussions over broader security 




The Possibility of 
North Korea’s Denuclearization
The Kim Jong-un Regime’s Policy Intent
4.1　　At the March 31, 2013 Central Committee of the Workers’ Party of Korea, First 
Secretary Kim Jong-un introduced strategies on “carrying out economic construction and 
building nuclear armed forces simultaneously” (KCNA 2013-5), which the 2015 New Year 
Address reconfirmed  (KCNA 2015). Rather than focusing on North Korea maintaining its 
“military rst” policy line, it is far more important to focus on the fact that North Korea is 
relativizing its “military rst” policy line. It can be said that “the end of son’gun (military rst 
strategy) is thus main meaning of byungjin (move two things simultaneously strategy)” 
(FRANK  2014). Developing North Korea’s economy would require developing Northeast 
Asia’s economic alliances, which, it is argued, would also require solving nuclear issues (KOO 
2014). First Secretary Kim Jong-un’s political regime will be stable, but the economic 
destitution is likely to be long-lasting (HAYES, TANTER & DIAMOND 2012). They will 
pursue efforts to open the economy slowly and under strict control. Although the execution of 
Jang Sung-taek, who was North Korea’s number two government official, was shocking, 
experts do not believe it implies a shift in strategy (MOON 2014). It is unlikely that the Kim 
Jong-un regime would engage in provocations that would trigger a full-scale war on the 
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Korean Peninsula. While it cannot be ruled out that events similar to the ROKS Cheonan 
sinking in 2010 and bombardment of Yeonpyeong, which heightened tensions, will recur, 
North Korea appears to be calculating the level at which they ratchet up tensions. Since such 
tension escalation by North Korea is considered a shock technique aimed at altering the rules 
of the game, it is crucial to react with a level head, however dif cult.
4.2　　This section focuses on analyzing the Kim Jong-un regime’s policies in relation to 
denuclearization issues. Just after a year in office, North Korea successfully launched a 
satellite in December 2012. The United Nations Security Council Resolution responded by 
intensifying sanctions on North Korea in January 2013. North Korea’s Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs then stated that “denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula is impossible unless the 
denuclearization of the world is realized.” (KCNA 2013-1) and that “there will no longer 
exist...the September 19 joint statement”, then “overall efforts should be directed to 
denuclearizing big powers, including the U.S., rather than the denuclearization of the Korean 
Peninsula” (Statement by the DPRK. National Defense Commission, KCNA  2013-2). At 
around the same time, the regime restructured its policies to strengthen its position as a 
nuclear weapon state (KCNA 2013-6), as was introduced in Paragraph 1.16. The shifting 
policies implied that North Korea was solidifying a long-term position on maintaining its 
nuclear deterrence. However, this strategic line does not necessarily mean that North Korea 
has taken a rigid position that its denuclearization is impossible before the “world-wide 
denuclearization” or “a world without nuclear weapons” is attained. Rather, it has soon become 
apparent that it maintains an open window to negotiate denuclearization while consolidating 
the domestic system as a nuclear armed state. The DPRK National Defense Commission 
released a “crucial” statement in June 2013, which de ned that the denuclearization of the 
Korean Peninsula should be “the complete one that calls for denuclearizing the whole 
peninsula, including South Korea, and aims to eliminate the U.S. nuclear threats to the DPRK 
and then said “We propose senior-level talks between the authorities of the DPRK and the 
U.S.” (KCNA 2013-8). This means that North Korea suggested the denuclearization process 
contingent on the removal of U.S. threats, as before. In September 2013, the DPRK Vice-
Minister for Foreign Affairs, Pak Kil-yon, attended the United Nations High-level Meeting on 
nuclear disarmament and expressed a similar attitude with regard to its denuclearization 
(PAK 2013). It can be inferred that North Korea is sticking to its policy of maintaining 
nuclear deterrence while attempting to diplomatically remove the U.S. threat. In fact, North 
Korea has never mentioned that its nuclear weapons were intended to give it parity or 
dominance; rather, the weapons have consistently been a means of self-defense. There is still 
53
The Technological Side of North Korea’s Nuclear Weapon Capabilities
4.3　　It has been confirmed that North Korea conducted three nuclear weapon tests in 
2006, 2009 and 2013, which demonstrated that North Korea’s nuclear capabilities are 
gradually improving. General information regarding these three nuclear tests can be found in 
Box 4. The October 2006 nuclear weapon test is estimated to have had a nuclear weapon yield 
of less than 1 kiloton (U.S. DIRECTOR OF NI 2006), (PABIAN & HECKER 2012) and 
most experts agree that North Korea “failed to meet their target”. That is because a single 
kiloton is signi cantly below the 10 20 kiloton nuclear weapon yield sought after in a typical 
rst nuclear weapon test (KIM 2013). The second experiment in May 2009 had an estimated 
nuclear weapon yield of several megatons ̶ 4 6 times the yield of the rst (U.S. DIRECTOR 
OF NI 2009), (PABIAN & HECKER 2012). According to public records, there have been no 
detections of radioactive nuclides, which would be evidence of a nuclear explosion (KIM 2013), 
(CTBTO 2009). The third experiment in February 2013 is estimated to have had a nuclear 
weapon yield similar to the second (several kilotons) and is considered by experts to have been 
a “success”. The rst two experiments were plutonium bombs, and although the evidence is 
missing, the third experiment may have utilized uranium (KIM 2013), (CTBTO 2009). North 
Korea stated that the third experiment used “a smaller and light A-bomb unlike the previous 
ones, yet with great explosive power”, which would imply that North Korea had successfully 
developed a nuclear bomb that could be tted to a missile (KCNA 2013-3). There have been 
various opinions regarding this statement. In February 2013, one expert published that “North 
Korea has the capability to mount a warhead on the Nodong missile” (ALBRIGHT 2013) and 
another publication in April 2013 printed that the U.S. Department of Defense has “moderate 
con dence” that North Korea had acquired the ability to miniaturize nuclear warheads so that 
they could be tted to ballistic missiles” (SHANKER, SANGER, & SCHMITT 2013). There 
are opposing opinions even within the U.S. government (ibid), (SCHMITT 2013) and other 
experts have said that “there is no evidence” (THIELMANN 2013). The Federation of 
American Scientists (FAS), which is an authority on evaluating nuclear weaponry, released 
that there is “no publicly available evidence that North Korea has operationalized its nuclear 
weapons capability” (KRISTENSEN & NORIS 2014). Conversely, on January 6, 2015 the 
South Korean Ministry of National Defense released a statement saying North Korea 
“appeared to have made a ‘significant’ advance toward making a nuclear warhead small 
enough to t onto a long-range missile” (CHOE 2015). Continuing to analyze North Korea’s 
nuclear capability is crucial. There has also been discussion regarding North Korea’s 
ambiguous public statements. In March 2014, the North Korean Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
stated that North Korea would use “more diversi ed nuclear deterrence” and would “not rule 
out a new form of nuclear test for bolstering its nuclear deterrence” (KCNA 2014-1). There 
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has been much speculation regarding the details of these new tests but North Korea’s 
“calculated ambiguity has been a feature of national nuclear postures” (LEWIS 2014), 
(BERGER 2014).
North Korean Nuclear Tests
1st Test: October 9th, 2006 




: Successful experiment using domestically developed technology. No risk 
of radiation exposure.
U.S. Director of National Intelligence: Con rmed on October 16
th
 that a nuclear experiment took 




U.S. Director of National Intelligence: A statement released on October 16
th
 said that radioactive 
nuclides were detected in samples collected on October 11
th
.
CTBTO: The IMS’s (International Monitoring System) Yellowknife Seismological Array in Canada 
announced on October 23
rd
 that it had detected Xe133
3)
. 
2nd Test: May 25th, 2009 




: A new plateau was reached with improved explosive power and control 
technology.  
CTBTO: Magnitude 4.52 
5)
U.S. Director of National Intelligence: A June 15
th
 statement announced that the nuclear weapon 




No radioactive nuclides were detected. 
3rd Nuclear Test: February 12th, 2013
　■Nuclear Weapon Yield:　7.4 25kt
Fissile Material: Undetermined whether plutonium or uranium was used.
North Korean Statement: Higher nuclear weapon yield and a smaller, lighter nuclear bomb. 




U.S. Director of National Intelligence: A February 12th statement announced that the nuclear 




CTBTO: Xe131m and Xe133 were detected 55 days after the experiment at Takazaki. The Ussuriysk 




1) KCNA 2006-2　　　　2) U.S. DIRECTOR OF NI 2006　　　　3) CTBTO　　　　4) KCNA 2009-3
5) CTBTO 2009　　　　6) U.S. DIRECTOR OF NI 2009　　　　7) PARK 2013　　　　8) KCNA 2013-3
9) CTBTO 2013-1　　　　10) U.S. DIRECTOR OF NI 2013　　　　11) CTBTO 2013-2
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4.4　　One method of measuring North Korea’s nuclear capabilities would be to assess its 
stockpile and production capacity of ssile material (highly-enriched uranium and plutonium). 
There have been estimates that by 2012, North Korea had produced four to eight nuclear 
warheads (KIM 2013), (SIPRI) and, assuming sustained production, would have 
approximately 12 nuclear warheads as of 2014 (ALBRIGHT & WALROUND 2012), 
(HECKER 2015). It is necessary to continue pursuing the relevant issue while keeping in 
mind that North Korea’s volume of fissile material will continue to grow if left unchecked. 
Nevertheless, considering the relatively small volume of fissile material in North Korea 
compared to other nuclear weapon states, the situation should be handled with a level head. It 
was estimated that North Korea had produced 40 to 50 kilograms of plutonium prior to their 
2006 nuclear weapon experiment (HECKER & LIOU 2015). Taking into consideration the 
three nuclear experiments, the Institute for Science and International Security (ISIS) 
estimated that North Korea possessed 30 to 34 kilograms as of December 2014 (TASS 2014). 
North Korea announced the resumption of operations at the graphite-moderated reactor 
(Paragraph 1.16) ,(KCNA 2013-6) and satellite images con rmed the reactor was operational 
(ALBRIGHT & KELLEHER-VARGANTINI 2014-1), (HANSEN 2013). Afterward, however, 
the reactor ceased operations for an uncon rmed reason and there are worries that the spent 
nuclear fuel is being reprocessed (ALBRIGHT & KELLEHER-VERGANTINI 2014-2). It 
also appears as though construction of the experimental light water reactor set for completion 
in 2012 has been delayed (ALBRIGHT, KELLEHER-VERGANTINI & YOU 2014). North 
Korea would theoretically gain the capacity to produce 20kg of plutonium per year once the 
light water reactor is completed (ALBRIGHT & WALROUND 2012). It would also appear as 
though North Korea is increasing its uranium enrichment capabilities. Satellite imagery 
shows the expansion of the Yongbyon enrichment facilities. Furthermore, the possibility of 
another smaller enrichment facility cannot be ruled out. Much about North Korea’s plutonium 
production and enriched uranium (degree of enrichment and general capabilities) remains 
uncertain, but it is expected that the country will gain the technological capability over the 
next two years to produce four to six nuclear weapons (HECKER 2015). It is crucial that 
dialog with North Korea recovers as soon as possible and that policy is needed to 
ensure the involvement of North Korea. The longer it takes for denuclearization 
negotiations to resume, the more time is available to do no good.
4.5　　This section evaluates the technological aspects of North Korea’s missile issues. Since 
firing its first long-range ballistic missile, Taepodong-1, in August 1998, North Korea has 
launched ve long-range ballistic missiles/satellites. Although there was no press release prior 
to the launch of Taepodong-1, North Korea revealed four days later that it had successfully 
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launched its rst satellite (KCNA 1998). There has been no third-party evidence showing that 
such satellite made it into orbit. Ever since, North Korea has issued some form of press release 
either before or after its launches. See Box 5 for details of launches since 1998. In 2006, North 
Korea launched seven missiles, including the Taepodong-2. In its press release, the country 
then attempted to legitimize its missile development program as a means of restoring military 
balance, citing the Iraq War and the U.S. accusing North Korea of being the “Axis of Evil” 
(KCNA 2006-1). Although one-sided, the press release detailed North Korea’s stance on 
consistency regarding the moratoriums it agreed with the U.S. and Japan regarding missile 
launches. In 2009, North Korea announced prior to the launch that it would out t the Unha-2 
rocket to launch the Gwangmyeongseong-2 satellite (KCNA 2009-1). Regarding the two 
launches in 2012, North Korea explains that it failed to launch the Unha-3 out tted with a 
Gwangmyeongseong-3 in April, but then succeeded in December. In relation to three launches 
North Korean Satellite/Ballistic Missile Launch Tests
August 31st, 1998 Taepodong-1 (Also known as Paektusan Ilbo-1 or Unha-1 in North Korea1) 2))
Performance:  North Korea announced it was a three-stage rocket3). A three-staged system 
is generally assessed as having improved the payload’s propulsion2),4),5). It 
has also been suggested that the launch was an attempt to launch the 
Gwangmyeongseong-2 satellite
5)
. The firing range was estimated at 




Results: The rst stage plummeted into the Sea of Japan, and the second into the 
Pacific Ocean. Although the claim has not yet been confirmed, North 
Korea announced it had succeeded in launching its rst satellite
3)
.
July 5th, 2006 Taepodong-2 (Paektusan Ilbo-2 or Unha -2) 2),4)。
Performance:  Because there is no video footage for this missile test, it is not known 
whether or not it was the same rocket as the Taepodong-2 launched in 
2009
4)
. The Japanese Government believes it was a two-stage ballistic 
missile, which used a new type of booster in the rst stage and a Nodong in 
the second stage. The ring range was estimated to be 6,000 kilometers
6)
. 
Launch Site:  Musudan-ri
Results: After the rocket reaches a few kilometers altitude in under a minute after 
launch, the rst stage of the rocket breaks apart mid ight̶as opposed to 
separating̶and the fragments fall near the launch site6). Seven missiles 
were launch in succession. The third rocket was the Taepodong-2.
April 5th, 2009 Taepondong-2 (three-staged rocket, Unha-2)
Performance: Three-staged rocket4). The Japanese Government believes the rocket 
was derived from the Taepodong-2. For example, it may have been a 
two-staged missile with a propulsion system attached to the 
payload̶hence making it a 3-staged rocket7). 
Box 5
1) AOKI 2014　　　　2) KIM 2013　　　　3) KCNA 1998　　　　4) SCHILLER 2012　　　　5) ELLEMAN 2013
6) JMOD 2007　　　　7) JMOD 2010　　　　8) KCNA 2009-1　　　　9) KCNA 2012-1　　　　10) KCNA 2012-2
11) JMOD 2014
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since 2009, publicly available technical information does not contradict the assumption that 
all three launches were satellite launches. Also it would be reasonable to assume that the 
1998 and 2006 launches carried the same mission. It is natural, however, that each of these 
launches will help improve North Korea’s ballistic missile launching capabilities. While 
claiming launches were nothing more than satellite launches, North Korea implied its 
capability to attack the mainland U.S. in its propaganda against the U.S. (e.g. KCNA 2013-4). 
The successful December 2012 satellite launch also indicates that North Korea’s three-stage 
rocket technology is improving. However, North Korea’s inability to control its satellite 
indicates its guidance technology has yet to mature. In general, the capability to launch a 
satellite does not immediately confirm the ability to launch an intercontinental ballistic 
missile. There are tests necessary for the heavier payload weight and atmospheric reentry, 
etc. that differ from those requested to launch a satellite (ELLEMAN 2013). Analysis of 
Launch Site:  Musudan-ri
Results:  The rocket flew more than 3,000km before plummeting into the 
Paci c Ocean
7)
. Although North Korea announced the launch was a 
success, there has been no evidence that the satellite entered orbit 
and is thus widely viewed as being a failure
2), 4)
. 
Summary:  Prior to the launch, North Korea announced on February 24th that it 
would deploy the Gwangmyeongseong-2,  an experimental 
communication satellite, by launching an Unha-2 Rocket.
 8)
 
April 13th, 2012 Modified Taepondong-2 Model (Unha-3)
Performance:  Three-stage rocket derived from the Taepodong-2.
Launch Site:  Tongch’ang-dong (Known as the “Sohae Satellite Launching Station” 
in North Korea.)
Results:  The rocket launched the Gwangmyeongseong-3 climate satellite, 
which failed to enter orbit
9)
. 
Summary:  North Korea announced the launch in advance and showed the 
preparation stages to foreign observers. The satellite was launched 




Performance:  Three-staged rocket derived from the Taepodong-2. Varying nations have 
estimated the ring range to be between 3,400 and 15,000 kilometers
2)
. 
Results:  North Korea announced that the earth observation satellite 
Gwangmyeongseong-3, Type 2 successfully entered orbit
10)
. 
International authorities have verified the claim. North Korea 
launched its own satellite faster than South Korea
1)
. The Japanese 
Ministry of Defense stated that North Korea’s missile development 
had “entered a new stage” 11). 
Summary:  North Korea announced the launch in advance and registered with 
the United Nations under the Convention on the Registration of 
Objects Launched into Outer Space.
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UN Security Council Resolutions and related statements on North 
Korea’s Nuclear Tests and Projectile Launches 
May 11th, 1993 Security Council Resolution 825 (1993)
The Council urges North Korea to recall the North-South Korea Joint Denuclearization 
Declaration and to reconsider its withdrawal from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.
November 4th, 
1994
Statement by the President of the Security Council   S/PRST/1994/64
The Council welcomed the Agreed Framework between the United States of America and 
the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and the freezing of North Korea’s graphite-
moderated reactors and other related facilities. The Council requests the IAEA resume 
its Safeguards Agreement.  
July 15th, 2006 Security Council Resolution 1695 (2006)
The Council condemns the multiple missile launches North Korea conducted on July 5
th
 
and demands the country suspend its ballistic missile programs. The Council also banned 
other nations from providing missile related materials and technology to North Korea.
October 6th, 
2006
Statement by the President of the Security Council S/PRST/2006/41
The Council condemned the Foreign Minister of North Korea’s announcement of 
upcoming nuclear tests made by the Foreign Minister of North Korea on October 3
rd
. It 
urged North Korea to return to the Six-Party Talks. 
October 14th, 
2006
Security Council Resolution 1718 (2006)
The Council condemns the nuclear weapon experiment North Korea conducted on October 
9
th
 and demands the country to suspend all nuclear tests and launching of ballistic 
missiles. In response to North Korea’s rst nuclear test, the resolution invokes Chapter 
VII, Article 41, of the UN Charter, and sanctions against North Korea by banning all 
imports of military equipment to the nation. 
April 13th, 2009 Statement by the President of Security Council S/PRST/2009/7
Condemns North Korea’s missile launch conducted on April 5th.
July 13th, 2009 Security Council Resolution 1874 (2009) 
The Council strongly condemns North Korea’s second nuclear test conduct on May 25th. 
In response to the second nuclear test, the Council demanded DPRK to terminate its 
nuclear tests and “any launching using ballistic missile technology.” This was the 
Council’s rst time to use such an expression. Under Chapter VII, Article 41, of the UN 
Charter, additional sanctions against North Korea, including freezing its assets and 
banning nancial trades, were invoked. Additionally it requested members of the UN to 
report on the progress made towards implementing the sanction. 
Box 6
fragments from the Unha-3 recovered by South Korea showed that the rocket was suitable for 
launching a satellite but not for launching a ballistic missile (WRIGHT 2013). Other experts 
argue that North Korea’s threat of ballistic missiles is nothing more than a political 
performance (SCHILLER 2012). The North Korean missile issues should be considered as 
exemplifying the problem of dual-use technology that has applications for both space 
exploration and ballistic missile development. The discussion needs to begin on the basis of a 
universal standard applicable to all nations.
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June 7th, 2010 Security Council Resolution 1928 (2010)
The Council reiterated the request for reports on progress towards invoking sanctions 
against North Korea in resolutions 1718 and 1874, and extended the deadline for 
submission of the report. 
June 10th, 2011 Security Council Resolution 1985 (2011)
Extended the mandate of an expert panel to monitor sanctions against North Korea, and 
directed the framework regarding the structure and deadline of the report.  
April 16th, 2012 Statement by the President of Security Council S/PRST/2012/13
The Council condemned North Korea’s missile launch conducted on March 13th, stating 
that it violated the Security Council’s Resolution that suspended “any launch that uses 
ballistic missile technology”.
June 12th, 2012 Security Council Resolution 2050 (2012)
The Council extended the mandate of an expert panel to monitor sanctions against North 
Korea, and directed the framework regarding the structure and deadline of the report.  
January 22nd, 
2013
Security Council Resolution 2087 (2013)
The Council condemned North Korea’s missile tests and demanded the country terminate 
all nuclear tests and “any launch that uses ballistic missile technology.” Invoking Chapter 
VII, Article 41, of the UN Charter, the Council resolved to strengthen the sanctions 
against North Korea by freezing its assets, banning financial trading, and travel. It 
requested other nations to report the condition of the sanction against North Korea.
March 7th, 
2013
Security Council Resolution 2094 (2013)
The Council strongly condemns DPRK’s third nuclear test held on February 12th, and 
demands the country to terminate all nuclear tests and “any launch that uses ballistic 
missile technology.” Invoking Chapter VII, Article 41, of the UN Charter, the Council 
decided to strengthen the sanction against North Korea freezing its assets, banning 
nancial trading, and traveling. Additionally it requested members of the UN to report 
on the progress made towards implementing the sanction.
March 5th, 
2014
Security Council Resolution 2141 (2014)
The Council extended the mandate of an expert panel to monitor sanctions against North 
Korea, and directed the framework regarding the structure and deadline of the report.  
The International Response to North Korea’s Developing Nuclear and 
Missile Capabilities
4.6　　The United Nations Security Council has repeatedly made Presidential Statements 
and passed resolutions in response to North Korea’s nuclear weapons tests and launches using 
ballistic missile technology. Box 6 summarizes these actions in historical order. The nuclear 
weapons issues can be traced back to North Korea’s withdrawal from the NPT in 1993. The 
missile issues can be traced back to the 1999 moratorium on ballistic missile tests (announced 
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by DPRK Foreign Ministry, KCNA 1999), which was a result of U.S.-North Korea talks after 
the Taepodong-1 launch at the end of August 1998. The UN Security Council Resolution 1874 
passed in 2009 banned North Korea “from any launch using ballistic missile technology”. It 
should be reminded that this demand to ban “any launch using ballistic missile technology” 
was introduced by linking such technology to North Korea’s nuclear weapon development 
program. It is also undeniable that North Korea has the same right to launch satellites into 
orbit for peaceful purposes as the rest of the world. The problem lies in using this technology 
to deliver a weapon of mass destruction. There is a need to clarify the correlation between the 
nuclear weapon problem and the ban on the “launch using ballistic missile technology”. 
Especially, when economic/ nancial sanctions are concerned, the issues of nuclear weapons 
and other weapons of mass destruction and those of missile launches have to be carefully 
distinguished because the consensus foundation of international law differs quite signi cantly 
between the two. In the former issues, there have been solid legal foundations such as NPT, 
Chemical Weapon Convention and Biological Weapon Convention. Solving the primary issue 
of weapons of mass destruction (particularly nuclear weapons) will subsequently reduce the 
gravity of the ballistic missile issues. The issue of reasonable arms control of ballistic missiles 
is not simple and should be discussed separately (RECNA 2013).
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Chapter 5
A Comprehensive Approach 
to the Denuclearization 
of Northeast Asia
Validity of Halperin’s Six Elements
5.1　　Halperin’s six elements, introduced in Paragraph 3.4, are an appropriate starting 
point for feasibly achieving the denuclearization of Northeast Asia. Resolving the first 
element, “The Termination of the Korean War”, would mean settling the negative historical 
legacy of the region. Taking into account the fact that North Korea has repeatedly demanded 
an end to the Korean War recently (for example KCNA 2010), this is undoubtedly an issue 
that should be addressed and included in the comprehensive approach. However, agreeing on 
the details and negotiation process of a peace treaty, which would replace the Korean 
Armistice Agreement, will likely be a great undertaking, in itself. There are many critical 
issues, such as the Maritime Military Demarcation Line, the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty and 
the handling of U.S. Forces stationed in the ROK. and their joint military exercises based 
upon the Mutual Defense Treaty between the U.S. and ROK. There is also the vital issue of 
reunification of the two Koreas. Under the comprehensive approach, concise political 
agreements and specific details should be considered in staged phases with an enforceable 
legal framework. This element and the third element, “Mutual Declaration of No Hostile 
Intent”, are closely related. The U.S. China, DPRK and ROK would be central to negotiating 
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this rst element. If these four nations and more speci cally the U.S.-DPRK and ROK-DPRK, 
were to mutually declare a non-hostile intent, element one will likely be achieved in substance. 
A paper that refers to the ASEAN Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia (TAC) 
provides useful information for this purpose (HAYES 2014). The TAC expresses equality of 
sovereignty, refraining from intervention in the domestic affairs of another nation, non-
aggression, prohibiting subversion of a nation and the right to national existence. 
Denuclearizing North Korea has been negotiated consistently in relation to North Korea’s 
energy development. The KEDO served that purpose (Paragraph 1.13) and the September 
19
th
 Joint Statement of the Six-Party-Talks stated that “the light water reactor offer to North 
Korea will be discussed at an appropriate time” while also mentioning “economic cooperation 
in areas of energy, trade and investment”. As such “provisions of assistance for nuclear and 
other energy” ̶ the fourth element ̶ is essential to a comprehensive approach. There is also 
a need to reach a mutual agreement that deals with North Korea’s current ‘Juche Nuclear 
Industry’ (Paragraph 1.16). Considering that North Korea is adamantly resisting sanctions 
imposed by the UN Security Council, the fifth element “Termination of Sanctions” will be 
essential to reach a comprehensive agreement. Halperin’s second element of establishing a 
Permanent Security council is mandatory to implement an enforceable legal framework. Thus, 
although there may be many adjustments to be made in the comprehensive approach toward 
establishing a NEA-NWFZ, Halperin’s Six Elements are valid and should be included.
5.2　　Certain elements not included in the Six Elements have been applied in this section. 
The first is the right to peaceful exploration of space. North Korea has repeatedly 
opposed sanctions that have been imposed for launching satellites. The comprehensive process 
to resolve the nuclear problems requires that all state have the right to develop space 
technology for peaceful purposes. At present all the member states of the Six-Party Talks are 
members of the 1967 Outer Space Treaty. Mutual agreement on an international level for 
handling ballistic missile launches is lacking, as was discussed in Paragraph 4.6 and 
discussions within a regional framework are dif cult. Furthermore, solving issues regarding 
ballistic missiles are not necessarily vital to resolving nuclear issues. The other element 
introduced here is eliminating concerns over chemical weapons. All states participating in the 
Six-Party Talks join the Biological Weapon Convention, but as for the Chemical Weapon 
Convention, North Korea is yet to be a member. The September 19 Joint Statement provided 
security assurances against both nuclear and conventional weapons use (Paragraph 1.15). If 
this can be accomplished as part of the comprehensive process, the agreement would be easily 
extended to ban and eliminate chemical weapons regionally. These additional two elements 
toward a comprehensive approach will inevitably surface in the discussion of the six elements. 
Rather than complicating the entire matter, resolving these issues will smooth the process. 
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With regard to the “provisions of assistance for nuclear and other energy” element, the 
challenge will be to address equal rights for the “nuclear fuel cycle” in the context of 
denuclearization and the provision of energy to stabilize North Korea. The objective of the 
former subject would be the “regionalization of the nuclear fuel cycle”. An examination of the 
‘Asian Super Grid’ is proposed to resolve the latter (SUZUKI 2014).
Proposal of a “Comprehensive Framework Agreement for the 
Denuclearization of Northeast Asia”
5.3　　Halperin’s six elements in his “Comprehensive Agreement on Peace and Security in 
NEA” and two additional elements closely tied to them, the right for peaceful space 
development and chemical weapons ban, are considered below to examine how to be organized 
in a “Comprehensive Approach for the Denuclearization of Northeast Asia”. Considering the 
history of past, failed joint statements among North Korea, U.S. and other countries, Halperin 
proposes a methodology in which the legally binding outline of the nal agreement should be 
agreed to start with, followed by negotiations of the details (HALPERIN 2011, 2014). This 
Proposal agrees with this Halperin’s methodology. When political leadership is weak, however, 
it can be difficult or take too long to go through the parliamentary process necessary for a 
legal instrument to be ratified. In this proposal, we suggest concluding a legally binding 
document called a “Comprehensive Framework Agreement for the Denuclearization 
of Northeast Asia” (CFA), which is to be signed by heads of the member states of the Six-
Party-Talks. Appointing an independent group of non-governmental, authoritative experts 
for support and verification can alleviate concerns regarding the CFA being overruled by 
changing administrations. The expert group will be deeply involved in the process leading up 
to manifesting the CFA and work for support and verification to ensure the continuity of 
negotiations after initial agreement is reached.
5.4　　The characteristics of each element introduced in the comprehensive approach are 
not uniform. Some elements may be issues and others may be organizational matters; some 
may be simple and others complicated. Accordingly, the speci cs of the CFA are proposed to 
be organized in four Chapters as shown below and are classified as either “Declaratory” or 
“Actionable”.
1)  Declare to terminate the Korean War and provide for mutual non-aggression, 
friendship and equal sovereignty among CFA state parties. States lacking diplomatic 
relations will endeavor to succeed in normalizing their diplomatic relations. Encourage 
negotiations for a peace treaty among the states concerned for the Korean War. 
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(Declaratory)
2)  Assure equal rights to access all forms of energy, including nuclear, to be accompanied 
by commitments to exclusively peaceful use. Establish a Northeast Asia Energy 
Cooperation Committee that is dedicated to contribute to the stability of Northeast 
Asia and the peaceful reuni cation of the Korean Peninsula and a stable Northeast 
Asia. The invitation for Committee members extends beyond the Six-Parties and is 
open to any state supporting the cause. (Declaratory. Actionable details will be decided 
by the Committee.)
3)  Agree on a treaty to establish a NEA-NWFZ. The treaty will provide for all 
actionable measures that regulate a nuclear weapon-free zone. It is advisable to 
ensure the treaty reflects the ideas introduced in Paragraphs 5.5 - 5.8. Signatory 
states are obligated to join the Chemical Weapons Convention. The agreement will 
protect the rights of signatory states to peaceful space exploration in accordance with 
the 1967 Outer Space Treaty. An article will address imposing sanctions on states in 
violation of the agreement and restrict a state party from independently imposing 
sanctions on another state party. (A Complete treaty. Actionable)
4)  Establish a permanent Northeast Asia Security Council. The primary objective of 
this council will be to enforce the CFA. The secondary objective will be, when 
appropriate, to serve as a platform for discussions involving various Northeast Asian 
security issues. In future, it would be advisable to become a platform for more 
comprehensive discussions regarding regional security issues. This council could also 
be positioned to serve as a mechanism to verify the NEA-NWFZ. The Six-Parties will 
form the executive council while member states of the Energy Cooperation 
Committee and any states or international organizations offering cooperation to 
achieve peace and security in Northeast Asia are welcome to be general members. 
(Actionable. Details of the Council will be provided in this chapter.)
Northeast Asia Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone Treaty
5.5　　Halperin’s proposal depicts the geographical scope of a NEA-NWFZ centered on 
North Korea, South Korea and Japan, adding Mongolia, Canada and others for possible 
participation. The proposal also states that a uni ed Korea should also be a non-nuclear state 
and is essentially similar to the “Three-plus-Three Arrangement” and correlates to it. 
Mongolia declares itself as being a Northeast Asian state (ENKHSAIKHAN 2012), but the 
nation has yet to express its interests to join a NEA-NWFZ. Mongolian efforts to 
institutionalize its nuclear weapon-free status through negotiations with China and Russia, 
followed by the P5 have been concluded with some success in October 2012 (Paragraphs 1.17 
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and 1.18). Because of this achievement, it is unlikely, under current circumstances, that 
Mongolia will propose the subsequent step. The outcomes of Mongolia’s negotiations with the 
P5 have not been perfect, however and a legally binding security assurance, which is 
Mongolia’s primary desire, has yet to be achieved. Accordingly, there is the potential for 
change in the situation after a certain period has elapsed and an opportunity presents itself. 
Because countries including Canada may convolute the regional de nition of “Northeast Asia”, 
a regionally definable treaty may be more effective, unless there is an obvious diplomatic 
advantage to including Canada. Nevertheless, Mongolia and Canada can serve a vital role as 
members of the “Energy Cooperation Committee” and “Northeast Asia Security Council” 
provided for in the CFA.
5.6　　Doubts over achieving a NEA-NWFZ repeatedly point toward the lack of mutual 
trust and con dence between the states within the region. As the Treaty of Tlatelolco, which 
overcame hostilities between Brazil and Argentina, demonstrates, however, a system in 
which articles enter into force can be structured to overcome trust issues and 
achieve a NEA-NWFZ, regardless of distrust among the states. More specifically, as 
Halperin suggested, the treaty could be structured to go into effect when the three nuclear 
weapon states (U.S., China and Russia) ratify the treaty and when two non-nuclear weapon 
states (Japan and ROK) do so. However, it would be plausible to include an option for Japan 
and Korea to secede from the treaty if North Korea did not join the treaty within three to ve 
years. (HALPERIN  2011) Amending the treaty as such would effectively remove Japan and 
South Korea’s concerns and encourage positive participation from both countries toward 
promptly effectuating the treaty. A significant merit for Japan and Korea to accelerate 
implementation of the treaty is obtaining security assurances from non-alliance nuclear 
weapon states. For Japan, it will resolve the threat of China’s nuclear weapons. Hayes also 
recognizes the right for Japan and Korea to exclude certain articles from the treaty. Once the 
articles are removed, however, the treaty will be rati ed and immediately come into effect for 
the signatory states (HAYES, TANTER & DIAMOND 2012). North Korea’s suspicions and 
concerns toward the nations concerned are deeply rooted. To resolve these suspicions, the 
treaty would specify that North Korea would join the treaty as a non-nuclear weapon state. 
Furthermore, as long as North Korea remains nuclear weapon-free, the U.S. and other nuclear 
weapon states will provide legally binding negative security assurance. Halperin proposes 
that North Korea would be allowed a speci ed timeframe to dismantle nuclear weapons and 
nuclear weapon-related factories and facilities. During this time frame, North Korea would be 
permitted to join the treaty as a non-nuclear weapon state, even if its disarmament is not 
complete. The U.S. would immediately provide security assurances during this timeframe 
(HALPERIN 2014).
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5.7　　In reality, not all Japan and South Korea’s concerns about North Korea’s nuclear 
weapons capability will be resolved by the entry-into-force processes detailed in Paragraph 
5.6. The threat of nuclear weapons existed in the region prior to negotiations for a NEA-
NWFZ treaty. Once the negotiations begin, however, the threat of nuclear weapons is replaced 
by suspicions of whether negotiations are being executed in good faith. This is also true of 
North Korea. North Korea may be possessed by a threatening idea whether or not the U.S. is 
negotiating in good faith. The unique nature of these relationships stem from the fact that 
states with nuclear weapons are attempting to achieve a NWFZ and requires prior 
deliberation. These problems may be resolved by agreeing on several moratoriums prior to 
negotiations to assure negotiations are held in good faith. North Korea would need a 
moratorium on nuclear tests and other nuclear weapon-related activities. The U.S., South 
Korea and Japan would likely need a moratorium on joint military exercises around the 
Korean Peninsula. In relation to prior moratoriums it would be desirable to consider some 
measures to alleviate sanctions currently imposed on North Korea.
5.8　　Some Japanese and South Korean politicians and policy makers supporting the NEA-
NWFZ are fearful of losing U.S. extended nuclear weapon deterrence. The sentiment is deeply 
rooted and they are not alone. A lack of understanding the nuclear weapon-free zone often 
sparks such fears. Conversely, it may be the unnecessary fear of what happens when the 
treaty is broken. In reality, nuclear weapon-free zones are protected by international law that 
prohibits attacks and threats with nuclear weapons, which is known as the negative security 
assurance. Accordingly, non-nuclear weapon states need not rely on extended nuclear 
deterrence to form a NWFZ. This fundamental principle must be understood and was 
emphasized at the workshops (DHANAPALA 2014), (MANTELS 2014). This is why a 
NWFZ is encouraged as a framework of cooperative security that does not depend 
on nuclear weapons. (Because the CFA includes a mutual agreement of non-aggression, the 
NEA-NWFZ would also be an area that does not permit the use or threatened use of 
conventional weapons. Considering past negotiations on the denuclearization of the Korean 
Peninsula, it may be possible to include conventional weapons as part of security assurances 
to be provided in a NEA-NWFZ treaty.) There is a need to respond, however, to an 
ineradicable doubt toward enforcing the law amidst the current, international political scene. 
The doubt is that non-nuclear weapon states will be defenseless, should the treaty be violated 
and the states are threatened by nuclear attacks. Once this occurs, the treaty will immediately 
be null and void and international affairs will return to a state unbound by a treaty. If the 
alliance with the U.S. continues, actions will be taken according to this alliance. To calm this 
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doubt, Halperin suggests that the treaty include an article purporting that if any of the state 
parties were to violate the treaty by using or threatening to use nuclear weapons, the treaty 
would be nulli ed. Moreover, other states parties can take sanctions against the offender in 
accordance with the international law and in methods their individual national constitution 
allows (HALPERIN 2014). Although this is a natural condition for any treaty, including this 
article within the treaty is intended to eliminate concerns. Conversely, emphasizing conditions 
to eliminate concerns may misleadingly suggest that the mentality toward extended nuclear 
deterrence in the NWFZ remains unchanged.
Current State of Affairs in Nations Involved in the Comprehensive 
Approach for a　NEA-NWFZ
5.9　　This chapter will introduce the state of affairs in Japan, South Korea and North 
Korea. The Japanese government has recently come to of cially discuss the issue of NEA-
NWFZ. The most recent edition of a P.R. publication of “Japan’s Disarmament and Non-
Proliferation Policy” (Edition 6, March 2013) reads, “the Three-plus-Three Arrangement, in 
which Japan, South Korea and North Korea form a nuclear weapon-free zone and the U.S., 
China and Russia provide negative security assurances, is recently gathering attention.” 
Natsuo Yamaguchi, Chief Representative of Komei Party and Katsuya Okada, former Foreign 
Minister of Japan and current President of Democratic Party of Japan, spoke at the Third 
Workshop Public Session in September 2014, both giving words to the effect that Japan’s 
proposal for a NEA-NWFZ may incentivize North Korea to denuclearize. Support from Japan’s 
public sector and mass media are also high. Over 540 heads of local governments have signed 
a petition to show support toward establishing a NEA-NWFZ. In April 2014, the Hiroshima 
and Nagasaki mayors submitted the signatures to UN Secretary-General Ban-Ki Moon. The 
majority of discussions to promote a NEA-NWFZ in Japan, however, are conducted in the 
context of denuclearizing North Korea and weak in emphasizing the obligation under NPT for 
nuclear dependent non-nuclear weapon states to eliminate their dependence on nuclear 
deterrence in their security policies. The Japanese government has been steadfast in its 
position that “the situation of the region is premature” and has yet to take any actions to move 
forward. In South Korea, discussions regarding “Denuclearizing the Korean Peninsula” are 
often strongly associated with reuni cation issues. However, in various sectors of the ROK, 
there are growing opportunities where the theme of “Denuclearization of Northeast Asia”, not 
just “Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula” is raised for discussions. Cheju Peace Forum 
has discussed this subject several times. The Kim Dae-jung Peace Memorial Symposium in 
October 2014, for example, hosted a session named “Options for Nuclear Weapons Free 
Northeast Asia”. Also, the South Korean Chapter of Parliamentarians for Nuclear Non-
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Proliferation and Disarmament (PNND) has held study sessions on a NEA-NWFZ. Joint 
efforts by Parliamentarians and citizens groups from Japan and South Korea have continued. 
As for North Korea, historically there has been little reference specifically to NEA as a 
NWFZ (PAIK  2014). There is no doubt that North Korea has received literature and updated 
information on the comprehensive approach, including a NEA-NWFZ, but there has been no 
detailed response. The Rodong Sinmun of the DPRK recently carried an article that re ected 
on the 1994 agreed framework and referred to a NWFZ. It reads “The DPRK put forth a 
proposal for building a nuclear-free zone through peaceful dialog and negotiations and 
combined it with the method of removing the U.S. nuclear threat by relying on international 
law.” (KCNA 2014-2). More details and the context of the article remain unknown.
5.10　　This section introduces the state of affairs of the U.S., China and Russia, based on 
ideas from researchers. As for the U.S., various reactions were available to Halperin’s proposal 
at the workshop organized by the Nautilus Institute in Washington D.C. in October 2012. The 
workshop received comments from a broad spectrum of experts. Those include the following. A 
supportive comment is that a new policy for engagement, such as the comprehensive 
agreement, is necessary instead of repeatedly demanding a CVID (complete, verifiable and 
irreversible disarmament) of DPRK nuclear weapons (BOSWORTH 2012); The theme of a 
NEA-NWFZ is an appropriate and new challenge for the Six-Party Talk (GOODBY  2012). 
Opinions on adverse influences on Japan-U.S. and ROK-U.S. security relationships were 
expressed, followed by suggestions to remedy them (SHIFFER 2012). Some remarks 
expressed skepticism and difficulty (GREEN 2012) and apprehension toward Japan and 
South Korea’s wavering trust in extended nuclear deterrent of the U.S. (SMITH 2012). Many 
of the divergent views on Halperin’s proposal seem resolvable by understanding the proposal 
in more detail. At present, it is recognized that this issue is relatively low on the Obama 
administration’s long list of diplomatic priorities, including issues of the Middle East and 
Ukraine. Accordingly, the administration will not initiate a move, but would also not oppose 
moves by Japan and South Korea to take the initiative (HALPERIN 2014). Through 
opportunities to discuss the proposal with many experts from China, it became evident that 
those who correctly understood the details of the proposal did not object (SHEN 2014). 
Russian specialists will likely also agree once the speci cs of the proposed NEA-NWFZ are 
thoroughly understood. Russia is working to strengthen economic relations with the Korean 
Peninsula and cautious of growing U.S. in uence seeks to stabilize the region. Furthermore, 
Russia has traditionally supported progress of discussions within the Six-Party Talks 
framework (MIZIN 2012). Russia served to chair the “Northeast Asia Peace and Security 
Mechanism Working Group” (Paragraph 1.15) established at the Six-Party Talks. It is 
reported that, in the working group in question, there were growing efforts to put the issue of 
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the denuclearization of North Korea in more comprehensive security issues of the region 
(NIKITIN 2014).
Views to the Diplomatic Process
5.11　　The United Nations has recently been a platform for furthering the discussion at 
hand. Angela Kane, the United Nations High Representative for Disarmament Affairs, 
expressed her thoughts when visiting Nagasaki in August 2012. Her view was that there was 
a dire need to denuclearize the Middle East and Northeast Asia, but that it was dif cult for 
the regions to make progress in (YAMAZATO 2012). This is likely a common understanding 




 sessions of the Advisory Board on Disarmament 
Matters held in 2013 discussed the NWFZ and specifically denuclearizing Northeast Asia. 
Reports from these sessions showed various opinions regarding the establishment of the NEA-
NWFZ were shared and included recommendations to the Secretary-General. The board 
recommended that the UN consider taking appropriate actions to establish the NWFZ and 
play a proactive role in establishing regional fora for transparency and con dence building 
(UNGA 2013). Since the initiative to establish a nuclear weapon-free zone should emanate 
exclusively from States within the region concerned (UNDC 1999), the role for the UN to play 
at this stage is limited; however, such recommendations submitted by the UN are a large leap 
forward. As was mentioned, the UN is currently capable of serving a vital role in the process 
of confidence building. Emphasis should be placed on the efforts of Mongolian President 
Elbedgorj from the One State Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone. He expressed his support for the 
NEA-NWFZ concept at the United Nations High-Level Panel in September 2013 and 
commenced the “Ulaanbaatar Dialogue on Northeast Asian Security” for con dence building 
(ELBEGDORJ 2013). It is desirable for the UN to take part in these discussions. Meanwhile, 
held at Daegu, South Korea in November 2013, China’s Chen Jian, former Under-Secretary-
General of the United Nations and former Ambassador to Japan, spoke at the 13
th
 East Asian 
UN system seminar (CHEN 2013). He expressed the view that a collaboration of proactive 
initiatives between Japan and Korea was essential to achieve a NEA-NWFZ. Frequently 
discussed throughout this proposal, Japan and South Korea have a crucial role in developing 
the NEA-NWFZ diplomatic process. In 2013, the South Korean Government announced their 
“Northeast Asia Peace and Cooperation Initiative (NAPCI) (ROK MOFA 2013). It is desirable 
for each state to take such initiatives toward promoting international dialog in the region.
5.12　　The nal section of this paper will examine the platform for discussions and the 
processes to achieve, regarding a “Comprehensive Approach for the Denuclearization of 
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Northeast Asia” or more speci cally regarding a “Comprehensive Framework Agreement for 
denuclearization in Northeast Asia” that has been proposed in this book. Although there may 
be other possibilities, resuming the Six-Party Talks would be the most appropriate and 
practical way to ensure the platform for this discussion. The Six-Party Talks has already 
established the “Northeast Asia Peace and Security Mechanism Working Group”, 
expressing its interests in discussing denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula in wider 
context. Efforts are currently underway to resume the Six-Party Talks and reportedly North 
Korea, China and Russia share an affirmative attitude (NEBEHAY 2014). Although some 
believed it would be best to scrap the Six-Party Talks in favor of a fresh start with a new 
platform and new ideas (RECNA 2013), North Korea and China’s opinions are crucial at this 
time and it is also critical to secure China’s continuous involvement in efforts to denuclearize 
Northeast Asia. It is also important that, as can be found in the consensus nal document of 
the 2010 NPT Review Conference (Paragraph 1.15, NPT 2010-8), the international 
community unanimously holds high expectations of the Six-Party Talks. As for the United 
States, it has been incapable of launching a new initiative to engage North Korea since the so-
called Leap Day Agreement between the U.S. and North Korea on February 29, 2012 failed in 
the resuming Six-Party Talks due to the missile launch by North Korea. It was just after the 
DPRK regime shift took place from General Secretary Kim Jong-Il to First Secretary Kim 
Jong-un. The U.S. visibly has its hands full with urgent issues in the Middle East, Ukraine 
and Afghanistan. Considering the discussions in this book of proposals, it is an opportunity for 
Japan and South Korea, independently or collaboratively, to take the lead. The Six-Party 
Talks should resume and be a platform for these discussions and work to achieve mutual 
agreements for a comprehensive approach. Just as Halperin consistently emphasizes, it is 
vital that Japan and Korea examine policy details and explore various routes and venues for 
close consultations with the U.S.. China and North Korea before actually resuming the Six-
Party Talks (HALPERIN 2011, 2012, 2014). Considering the NPT 2010 Final Document 
strongly supports the Six-Party Talks (NPT 2010-8), the upcoming 2015 NPT Review 
Conference will be a signi cant diplomatic platform to address the issue.
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With the 2015 NPT Review Conference approaching, the gap between the ones who call for a 
legal prohibition of nuclear weapons based on their inhumanity and those who continue to 
emphasis on the “step-by-step” approach, claiming that time is not ripe yet for such a legal 
discussion, has become more evident. Against such a background, policies taken by 
non-nuclear weapon states which rely on the extended nuclear deterrence have become 
increasingly critical. This session will focus on issues related to global nuclear disarmament, 
and, in such context, on nuclear issues related to the peace and security of Northeast Asia, and 
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In 2011, Dr. Morton H. Halperin proposed a “Comprehensive Agreement on Peace and 
Security in Northeast Asia” as an idea for a diplomatic process to overcome the stalemates 
regarding efforts that had been underway in various ways to denuclearize Korean Peninsula. 
This is an initiative aimed at establishing a NEA-NWFZ, while solving, as a comprehensive 
package, other outstanding issues that have close relation. This session will discuss his 
updated proposal, taking recent situation into consideration.   
This session will overview the security environment of Northeast Asia as a backdrop of a 
“Comprehensive Agreement” discussed in Session II to help improving such an approach as 
well as to study possible changes in the regional security environment resulting from pursuing 
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This session will discuss possible roles taken by various actors, including state governments, 
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